Abstract
Keywords
Introduction
Canonicity and HPS
Iteration in action
The tragedy of the canon
Balancing the aspects of canonical case construction
Coda: Affirmative action for case studies
References
ABSTRACT
We have previously argued that historical cases must be rendered canonical before they can plausibly serve as evidence for philosophical claims, where canonicity is established through a process of negotiation among historians and philosophers of science (Bolinska and Martin, 2020). Here, we extend this proposal by exploring how that negotiation might take place in practice. The working stock of historical examples that philosophers tend to employ has long been established informally, and, as a result, somewhat haphazardly. The composition of the historical canon of philosophy of science is therefore path dependent, and cases often become stock examples for reasons tangential to their appropriateness for the purposes at hand. We show how the lack of rigor around the canonization of case studies has muddied the waters in selected philosophical debates. This, in turn, lays the groundwork for proposing ways in which they can be improved.
Introduction
Philosophy of science assumes as its object of inquiry the entire edifice of human efforts to acquire and systematize natural knowledge. However, to the extent that they confront the actual practice of science, philosophers address themselves to only a sliver of all that occurs or has occurred under that umbrella.