Abstract
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Introduction
Companies’ conduct has shifted as a result of globalization’s impact on the global economy. Market development and intense competition push managers to use accounting manipulation strategies to manipulate accounting results to offer a perfect picture of a company’s economic and financial status (Afifa et al., 2021; Alzoubi, 2016, 2019). This is performed through the use of accounting standards’ flexibility, or even by noncompliance, by modifying financial statements (Saleh et al., 2020a). Furthermore, there are studies that warn of risk behaviors and the elements that lead to these deviant attitudes on the part of managers and administrators, culminating in accounting fraud, with consequences not only for the companies but also for present and potential investors (Alqirem et al., 2020; Farouk and Hassan, 2014; Li, 2014; Phan et al., 2020). Earnings management (EM) is concerned with maximizing or decreasing returns to achieve certain side goals, such as tax evasion or otherwise demonstrating development in the company’s potential to enhance the company’s reputation with shareholders, creditors and other interested parties (Dempster and Oliver, 2019; Du and Shen, 2018; Li, 2014). EM may affect the consistency, impartiality and honesty of accounting information, decreasing the quality of information provided to users and, as a result, misinforming those users (Almarayeh et al., 2020; Huynh, 2018). Furthermore, with a number of companies engaged in financial scandals, the auditor’s independence and the role of the external auditor in the companies were brought into question, casting doubt on the audit’s quality. Several empirical investigations, however, have discovered a positive association between audit quality and financial reporting quality presented by publicly listed companies in the backdrop of many financial catastrophes (Alzoubi, 2016). Among these empirical investigations, a rising number of studies targeted EM particularly. Recent high-profile audit failures of companies have sparked interest in the nature, limitations and causes of EM. Habbash et al. (2013), Alzoubi (2016), Alqirem et al. (2020) and Saleh et al. (2020a) emphasized the importance of audit quality in EM, stating that EM focuses on hiding information from stakeholders, and audit quality helps to transmit real-time information to stakeholders and other users. Furthermore, Rusmin (2010) claimed that EM erodes investors’ trust in the accuracy of financial reporting and obstructs the effective flow of money in financial markets, whereas Saleh et al. (2020b) claimed that audit quality improves investors’ trust in the quality of financial reporting and assists them in making appropriate decisions. Auditors play an active role in the preservation and dissemination of high-quality financial reporting.