مقاله انگلیسی مدیریت سود و مکانیسم های حاکمیت داخلی
Abstract
Abbreviations
JEL classification
Keywords
Introduction
Theory and literature review
Hypotheses development
Sample selection and data
Methodology
Results
Conclusion
Declaration of Competing Interest
Acknowledgement
Appendix A. Variable Definitions and Descriptions
References
ABSTRACT
Motivated by the managers’ social norms and religious orientations, this study offers new avenues for investigating the effect of internal governance in curbing earnings management. We comparatively assess whether internal governance mechanisms (i.e., boards of directors and audit committees) employed by Islamic and conventional banks could differentially mitigate earnings management. We take a step further to assess this association under the extended governance mechanism (i.e. Shari’ah supervisory board) employed by Islamic banks. For a global sample of 14 countries operating on a dual banking system between the years 2007− 2015, we find that, on average, having effective boards and audit committees enhance the quality of financial reporting in banking industry. Conditional on bank type, we find that large and independent board of directors (and audit committees) are negatively associated with earnings management for Islamic and conventional banks. There are no structural differences across the two bank types for the effectiveness of these traditional governance mechanisms. We also find that Shari’ah supervisory board (i.e., non-traditional governance) can significantly reduce earnings management. This finding is more evident when this board is large; its members have financial expertise and serve on multiple banks’ boards. Our results provide important implications for regulators governing dual banking systems by highlighting the explicit role of religiosity on managerial opportunism and the impact of double governance in promoting high financial reporting quality for global banking.
Introduction
The quality of financial reporting has long been discussed as having broader moral and ethical implications on various stakeholders (Du et al. 2015; Kanagaretnam et al., 2015; Lai et al., 2016; Vladu et al., 2017). Corporate scandals (e.g., Enron and WorldCom) have raised serious concerns about the credibility of financial statements over the last decade. Organisations enjoy legitimacy as they show that their activities are congruent with wide societal acceptations. Managers might be motivated in some situations to show that their firms adhere to the prevailing systems of acceptable norms, beliefs and cultural values to confer legitimacy upon their organisations (Wijayana and Gray, 2018). A weak system of governance is likely to offer managerial incentives to opportunistically manipulate reported earnings. Earnings management1 has been documented as one of the most critical questionable practices, which have substantial detrimental societal and economic consequences (Dechow et al., 1996; Klein, 2002; Leuz et al., 2003). Earnings management emerge within the presence of several motives (e.g. stock market incentives, compensation contracts incentives, debt contracts incentives, political incentives). Consequently, financial reporting quality is substantially lower as investors receive inaccurate information about the actual financial performance of the entities. This could cause adverse selection problems and moral hazards (Jiraporn et al., 2008; Chen et al., 2010).