Abstract
1- Introduction
2- Theoretical framework and hypotheses
3- Data and methods
4- Results
5- Discussion
References
Abstract
We investigate how human beliefs are associated with the absorption of specialist knowledge that is required to produce cyber-security. We ground our theorizing in the knowledge-based view of the firm and transaction-cost economics. We test our hypotheses with a sample of 262 members of an information-sharing and analysis center who share sensitive information related to cyber-security. Our findings suggest that resource belief, usefulness belief, and reciprocity belief are all positively associated with knowledge absorption, whereas reward belief is not. The implications of these findings for practitioners and future research are discussed.
Introduction
For both public and private organizations, effective cyber-security is required to prevent business interruption and thus to ensure operational continuity (Fransen, Smulders, & Kerkdijk, 2015; Furnell & Clarke, 2012; Gordon, Loeb, & Zhou, 2016; Luiijf & Klaver, 2015; Skopik, Settanni, & Fiedler, 2016; Tounsi & Rais, 2018). The production of such cyber-security is a knowledge-intensive task (Ben-Asher & Gonzalez, 2015; Jakobson, 2011). Despite the fact that hardware and software components required for this defense are relatively homogeneous and readily available at low cost or even for free (Anderson, 2001; Hofmann & Ramaj, 2011), highly specialist knowledge is required to combine and deploy these components effectively for organizational defense — for instance, by designing resilient systems architectures and implementing them efficiently (Etzioni, 2011; Lee, Bagheri, & Kao, 2015). Hence, cyber-security is a complex capability that is not readily created by the purchasing of technological components; rather, it is the skilled knowledge of how to organize and orchestrate these components that creates the actual defense (Anderson, 2001; Hofmann & Ramaj, 2011; Solms & Niekerk, 2013). Furthermore, due to the swift technological evolution and short technology life-cycles of these components, knowledge required to produce cyber-security becomes obsolete (Casas et al., 2017; Chen, Chiang, & Storey, 2012; Mahmood & Afzal, 2013; Wang et al., 2014).