چکیده
مقدمه
پیش زمینه و توسعه فرضیه
طراحی تحقیق و انتخاب نمونه
نتایج
توجه IRS و تسویه حساب مالیاتی آتی
تست های استحکام
نتیجه گیری
منابع
Abstract
Introduction
Background and hypothesis development
Research design and sample selection
Results
IRS attention and future tax settlements
Robustness tests
Conclusion
References
چکیده
ما بررسی می کنیم که آیا خدمات درآمد داخلی (IRS) از اطلاعات عمومی برای به دست آوردن سیگنال های کیفی در مورد کیفیت اطلاعات مالی شرکت ها یا یکپارچگی مدیریت استفاده می کند یا خیر. با استفاده از تهیه اطلاعات عمومی به عنوان نماینده ای برای توجه IRS، ما آزمایش می کنیم که آیا سیگنال های عمومی با کیفیت اطلاعات ضعیف (تجدید بیان) منجر به افزایش توجه IRS می شود یا خیر. برای شروع، ما مستند میکنیم که IRS نسبت به سایر پروندههای شرکت، احتمال بیشتری دارد و سریعتر به پروندههای عمومی که اعلام مجدد ارائه میکنند، میرسد. علاوه بر این، مواردی را بررسی میکنیم که در آنها IRS احتمالاً از یک بیانیه مجدد مطلع میشود و توجه بیشتری را در مورد انتشارات مطبوعاتی و پوشش رسانهای از بیانیه مجدد پیدا میکند. در ادامه پیامدهای افزایش توجه IRS را بررسی می کنیم. با استفاده از تحلیل مسیر، متوجه میشویم که توجه IRS هم با سطوح بالاتر تسویه حساب مالیاتی در آینده و هم با احتمال بیشتری برای ذکر ممیزی مالیاتی مرتبط است. به طور کلی نتایج ما با پاسخ IRS به سیگنالهای کیفیت ضعیف اطلاعات یا یکپارچگی مدیریت مطابقت دارد، گویی گزارشدهی نادرست مالی و گزارش مالیاتی مرتبط هستند.
توجه! این متن ترجمه ماشینی بوده و توسط مترجمین ای ترجمه، ترجمه نشده است.
Abstract
We examine whether the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) uses public information to obtain qualitative signals regarding the quality of firms’ financial information or management integrity. Using the procurement of public information as a proxy for IRS attention, we test whether public signals of poor information quality (restatements) lead to an increase in IRS attention. To begin, we document that the IRS is both more likely and quicker to acquire public filings announcing a restatement than any other filing of the firm. Furthermore, we examine instances in which the IRS is more likely to learn of a restatement and find an increase in attention around both press releases and media coverage of the restatement. Next we examine the implications of increased IRS attention. Employing path analysis, we find that IRS attention is associated with both higher levels of future tax settlements and a greater likelihood of the mention of a tax audit. Overall our results are consistent with the IRS responding to signals of poor information quality or management integrity as if financial misreporting and tax reporting are related.
Introduction
Research provides limited insight into what draws the attention of tax authorities to public information and how that information is used in the process of examining corporate tax positions. For publicly traded firms in the United States, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has access to both public and private information from publicly mandated disclosures required by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and private disclosures submitted via corporate tax returns. The use of public information provides additional data to the IRS that can be used in tax enforcement to complement the agency’s private information. We investigate whether the IRS uses public information to obtain qualitative signals about firms’ information environment or management integrity. We then examine the implications of increased IRS scrutiny for firms’ future tax activity and the enforcement thereof.
Conclusion
We examine whether restatements draw scrutiny from the IRS. We use a unique dataset that captures the IRS’s acquisition of firms’ public financial disclosures, which proxies for IRS attention. We first find that the information acquisition tendencies of the IRS for restatements are unique. We then find an increase in the acquisition of all public filings in the month of the restatement announcement. We also investigate restatements initiated from fraud investigations and those that require firms to alert investors and reissue financial statements and find that both add incrementally to the attention the IRS gives a restatement. In a separate analysis, we use the disclosure of internal control weaknesses as an additional signal of poor information quality and find a similar increase in IRS attention following the disclosure of such a weakness. Finally, we investigate the consequences of the observed increase in IRS attention. Using path analysis, we find that IRS attention around restatements relates positively to future tax enforcement using future tax settlements and disclosures that the firm is under tax audit.
H1: IRS attention to a firm’s public filings will increase in the month of a restatement announcement
H2a: Restatements stemming from fraud will generate a larger increase in attention from the IRS, relative to all other restatement types
H2b: Restatements stemming from an error will generate a smaller increase in attention from the IRS, relative to all other restatement types
H3: The increase in IRS attention around restatements will be associated with a change in future tax enforcement