دانلود مقاله تفاوت در محافظه کاری حسابداری دولتی در حوزه های قضایی
چکیده
مقدمه
پیش زمینه، مروری بر مطالعات پیشین و توسعه فرضیه
طراحی پژوهش
نتایج اصلی
تجزیه و تحلیل تکمیلی
نتیجه گیری
منابع
Abstract
Introduction
Background, literature review, and hypothesis development
Research design
Main results
Supplementary analysis
Conclusion
References
چکیده
ما از تعدیل‌های پایان سال برای مفاد ضرر وام دانشجویی دولت‌های ایالتی و استانی در ایالات متحده و کانادا برای بررسی محافظه‌کاری حسابداری دولتی و نحوه تغییر آن بین این کشورهای مجاور و بسیار یکپارچه استفاده می‌کنیم. با تکیه بر ویژگی‌های فرهنگی محافظه‌کارانه‌تر کانادا، فرضیه‌ای را مطرح می‌کنیم و متوجه می‌شویم که دولت‌های استانی کانادا مقررات محافظه‌کارانه‌تری را برای از دست دادن وام‌های دانشجویی نسبت به دولت‌های ایالتی ایالات متحده گزارش می‌دهند. علاوه بر این، تعدیل‌های پایان سال در قوانین کانادا به شدت محافظه کارانه هستند. آنها بزرگتر از آستانه اهمیت حسابرسی هستند. ما همچنین دریافتیم که ایدئولوژی سیاسی دولت، مشوق های گزارش دهی دولت، بدهی های دولتی و رقابت سیاسی عوامل مهمی در محافظه کاری حسابداری دولت هستند. در نهایت، ما یک ارتباط منفی بین تعدیل پایان سال برای تأمین و وام‌های دانشجویی آینده پیدا کردیم. این نتیجه نشان می دهد که محافظه کاری حسابداری دولتی منجر به سهمیه بندی اعتبار و پیامدهای اجتماعی قابل توجهی برای دانشجویان می شود. به طور کلی، مطالعه ما جنبه های مهمی از عوامل تعیین کننده و پیامدهای محافظه کاری حسابداری دولتی را برجسته می کند. تا جایی که ما می دانیم، این مطالعه اولین مطالعه ای است که محافظه کاری حسابداری بدون قید و شرط دولت را بررسی می کند.
توجه! این متن ترجمه ماشینی بوده و توسط مترجمین ای ترجمه، ترجمه نشده است.
Abstract
We use the year-end adjustments to the provisions for student loan losses of state and provincial governments in the United States and Canada to study government accounting conservatism and how it varies between these adjacent and highly integrated countries. Building on Canada’s more conservative cultural attributes, we hypothesize and find that Canadian provincial governments report more conservative provisions for student loan losses than U.S. state governments. Moreover, the year-end adjustments to the provisions in Canada are excessively conservative; they are larger than the audit materiality threshold. We further find that the political ideology of the government, government reporting incentives, government debt, and political competition are important determinants of government accounting conservatism. Finally, we find a negative association between the year-end adjustment to the provision and future student lending. This result suggests that government accounting conservatism leads to credit rationing and significant societal consequences for students. Overall, our study highlights important aspects of the determinants and consequences of government accounting conservatism. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to examine government unconditional accounting conservatism.
Introduction
A broad literature examines accounting disclosures in the public sector. Most of those studies aim to identify the factors that motivate bureaucrats to disclose public financial information (e.g., Ingram 1984; Cheng 1992). Studies further examine the timeliness of the information disclosure (e.g., reporting lag, Dwyer and Wilson 1989) and the quality of the disclosure in terms of the information disclosed (Robbins and Austin 1986). Separately, since the seminal work of Basu (1997), empirical research on accounting conservatism has prospered (Zhong and Li 2017) by primarily examining publicly listed companies. Researchers also examine accounting conservatism in other settings, such as family firms (Chen et al. 2014; Raithatha and Shaw 2019), privately held firms (Ball and Shivakumar 2005; Cano-Rodriguez 2010; Haw et al. 2014; Baik et al. 2020), and across countries (Ball et al. 2000; Bushman and Piotroski 2006). While the literature has examined many aspects of conservatism, accounting conservatism in the public sector remains unexplored. (For a comprehensive discussion of accounting conservatism and a review of the literature, see Watts 2003a, 2003b; Ryan 2006; Ruch and Taylor 2015; and Zhong and Li 2017.)
Conclusion
Using the year-end adjustments to the provision for student loan losses, we examine differences in government conservatism in Canada and the United States. We also examine the within-country determinants of government accounting conservatism and their societal consequences.
American society is a more individualistic and masculine society and is less concerned about uncertainty avoidance, as compared to Canada. These cultural attributes have been shown to be associated with accounting choices (Schultz and Lopez 2001; Salter et al. 2013), earnings management (Nabar and Boonlert-U-Thai 2007; Han et al. 2010), and financial reporting practices, such as benchmark beating (Kanagaretnam et al. 2011). These cultural traits have also been found to be associated with less conservative accounting practices (Kanagaretnam et al. 2014). We therefore predict and find consistent evidence that the provincial governments in Canada exercise a higher degree of conservatism—and even excessive conservatism—over the provision for student loan losses than do state-run loan authorities in the United States.
H1: Government accounting conservatism is higher in Canada than in the United States
H2a: The political ideology of the government does not affect the level of government accounting conservatism
H2b: There is a positive association between the pre-allowance balance and government accounting conservatism
H2c: The level of government debt is positively associated with government accounting conservatism
H2d: Political competition is not associated with government accounting conservatism
H3: There is a negative association between the provision for student loan losses and future student lending
EC: The difference between the actual student loan loss provision and the estimated, pre-adjusted provision minus the materiality threshold amount, scaled by the province (state) population for the Canadian (U.S.) sample
EC_UNSC: The difference between the actual student loan loss provision and the estimated, pre-adjusted provision minus the materiality threshold amount, in millions of dollars
EC_DUM: A binary variable set to 1 if EC is positive and to 0 otherwiseYE_Adj: The difference between the actual and estimated loan loss provisions, scaled by population
YE_Adj_UNSC: The difference between the actual and estimated loan loss provisions, in millions of dollars
CAN: A binary variable set to 1 for the Canadian observations and to 0 for the U.S. observations
PARTY: A binary variable set to 1 when a right-of-center political party forms the government in the Canadian provinces and set to 1 in the U.S. when the governor of the state is a Republican and to 0 otherwise
BALANCE_PRE: The province’s operational balance before the year-end adjustment to the student loan loss provision, scaled by population
DEBT: The annual ratio of provincial/state debt outstanding to provincial/state GDP
POL_COMP: A measure of political competitiveness (Endersby et al. 2002)
SIZE: The natural logarithm of the provincial or state population
BUDGET: Ordinal ranking of budget-balanced legislation effectiveness, ranging from 0 (no legislative controls) to 10 (strict controls)
ELECTION: A binary variable set to 1 for election years and to 0 for non-election years
GDP_GROWTH: The provincial/state GDP growth change rate
WRITEOFF: The amount of student loan write-offs, scaled by population
Est_Allowance: The expected student loan loss provision, calculated based on the government guidelines, scaled by population
S_Loan: Student loans outstanding, scaled by total population
UNEMPLOYMENT: The change in the provincial annual unemployment rate, multiplied by 100
TUITION: The average provincial undergraduate tuition fees for all fields of study
RECESSION: A binary variable set to 1 for the years 2008 and 2009 and 0 otherwise, to reflect the years of Canadian recessions