دانلود مقاله کاهش مدیریت سود توسط ارتباطات سیاسی
چکیده
مقدمه
مجموعه نهادینه
توسعه فرضیه
نمونه و روش شناسی
نتایج تجربی
تجزیه و تحلیل های اضافی
نتیجه گیری
منابع
Abstract
Introduction
Institutional setting
Hypothesis development
Sample and methodology
Empirical results
Additional analyses
Conclusion
References
چکیده
این مطالعه بررسی می‌کند که آیا ارتباطات سیاسی با مدیریت سود (هم مبتنی بر تعهدی و هم واقعی) مرتبط است و اینکه آیا انجمن تحت تأثیر حاکمیت شرکتی و کیفیت حسابرسی خارجی است یا خیر. شواهد تجربی در مورد ارتباط بین ارتباطات سیاسی و مدیریت درآمد نامشخص است و نتایج متفاوتی ارائه می دهد. با استفاده از نمونه‌ای از شرکت‌های اندونزیایی، متوجه می‌شویم که ارتباطات سیاسی با مدیریت سود مبتنی بر تعهدی (AEM) و واقعی (REM) رابطه منفی دارد. علاوه بر این، رابطه منفی بین ارتباطات سیاسی و مدیریت سود در شرکت‌های با حکومت بهتر و شرکت‌هایی که توسط یکی از 4 حسابرس بزرگ حسابرسی می‌شوند، آشکارتر است. نتایج نسبت به معیارهای جایگزین مدیریت سود، درون‌زایی و آزمون‌های نمونه فرعی قوی هستند. نتایج ما ادبیات را با روشن کردن نقش حاکمیتی و مزایای ارتباطات سیاسی گسترش می‌دهد.
توجه! این متن ترجمه ماشینی بوده و توسط مترجمین ای ترجمه، ترجمه نشده است.
Abstract
This study examines whether political connections are associated with earnings management (both accrual-based and real) and whether the association is influenced by corporate governance and external auditing qualities. Empirical evidence on the association between political connections and earnings management remains unclear and offers mixed results. Using a sample of Indonesian firms, we find that political connections are negatively related to accrual-based (AEM) and real (REM) earnings management. In addition, the negative relationship between political connections and earnings management is more pronounced in better-governed firms and those audited by one of the Big 4 auditors. The results are robust to alternative measures of earnings management, endogeneity, and subsample tests. Our results extend the literature by shedding additional light on the governance role and benefits of political connections.
Introduction
This study examines the relationship between political connections and accrual-based and real earnings management. The benefts of political connections for the frms are well established in the literature. Prior research fnds that politically connected frms have better access to bank loans and equity markets (e.g., Liu et al. 2013; Shen and Lin 2016), cheap fnancing from state-owned banks (e.g., Dinç 2005), lower cost of debt (e.g., Chaney et al. 2011), and lower cost of equity (e.g., Boubakri et al. 2012). Prior research also fnds that politically connected frms have higher frm performance and value (e.g., Fisman 2001), receive government contracts (e.g., Agrawal and Knoeber 2001; Schoenherr 2019), receive corporate bailouts when facing fnancial distress (e.g., Faccio et al. 2006), receive a higher allocation of government investment during fnancial crises (e.g., Duchin and Sosyura 2012), and have higher levels of tax aggressiveness (Kim and Zhang 2016). Our study extends the literature on the economic consequences of political connections by examining whether they provide additional benefts in terms of reducing opportunistic earnings management.
Conclusion
This study investigates whether political connections are related to earnings management and whether this relationship is infuenced by the presence of high-quality auditors and the strength of frm-level corporate governance. Using a sample of publicly listed frms in Indonesia, the fndings suggest that political connections efectively reduce accrual-based and real earnings management. We fnd that the role of political connections in reducing earnings management is pronounced in frms audited by high-quality auditors and in those with better corporate governance. The fndings are robust to alternative measures of earnings management and diferent empirical specifcations. This study extends prior research by providing evidence for the role of political connections in infuencing accounting outcomes in an emerging market where corporate reporting practices are shaped by inadequate protection for minority investors, high information asymmetry, and weaker corporate governance practices.
H1: Political connections are negatively related to real and accrual-based earnings management
H2: The negative relationship between political connections and real and accrual-based earnings management is more pronounced in frms audited by one of the Big 4 auditors
H3: The negative relationship between political connections and real and accrual-based earnings management is more pronounced in frms with strong corporate governance