چکیده
مقدمه
پیش زمینه ای درباره اطلاعات سیاسی
داده ها و اندازه گیری
آزمون های تجربی: تمایل به راهنمایی
زمانبندی راهنمایی پیرامون رویدادهای سیاسی مشروط به دسترسی سیاسی
تجزیه و تحلیل استحکام برای پرداختن به خود انتخابی
نتیجه گیری
منابع
Abstract
Introduction
Background on political information
Data and measurement
Empirical tests: Propensity to guide
Timing of guidance around political events conditional on political access
Robustness analyses to address self-selection
Conclusions
References
چکیده
ما بررسی میکنیم که آیا شرکتهای مرتبط با سیاسی نقشی در انتشار اطلاعات سیاسی از طریق راهنمایی مدیریت خود دارند یا خیر. با استفاده از فعالیتهای تأمین مالی کمپین یا حضور یک دفتر امور دولتی برای دسترسی شرکتها به اطلاعات سیاسی، متوجه میشویم که شرکتهایی که از نظر سیاسی مرتبط هستند، احتمالاً راهنماییهای مدیریتی را صادر میکنند، و راهنماییهای آنها به احتمال زیاد درباره سیاستهای دولت بحث میکند. علاوه بر این، این روابط برای شرکت هایی که با هزینه های اختصاصی بالای افشا مواجه هستند، کاهش می یابد. برای ارائه شواهدی در مورد منبع اطلاعات سیاسی افشا شده از طریق راهنمایی، زمان صدور راهنمایی را بررسی می کنیم. ما متوجه شدیم که شرکتهایی که از نظر سیاسی مرتبط هستند، احتمالاً راهنماییها را صادر میکنند و اطلاعات مربوط به سیاستهای دولتی خود را قبل از افشای عمومی تصمیمهای سیاست دولت تغییر میدهند. در مجموع، این یافتهها نشان میدهد که شرکتهای اطلاعات ممتاز از طریق ارتباطات سیاسی خود به دست میآورند، از طریق افشای داوطلبانه با سرمایهگذاران به اشتراک گذاشته میشود.
توجه! این متن ترجمه ماشینی بوده و توسط مترجمین ای ترجمه، ترجمه نشده است.
Abstract
We examine whether politically connected firms play a role in disseminating political information via their management guidance. Using campaign financing activity or the presence of a government affairs office to proxy for firms’ access to political information, we find that politically connected firms are more likely to issue management guidance, and their guidance is more likely to discuss government policies. Further, these relations are attenuated for firms facing high proprietary costs of disclosure. To provide evidence on the source of the political information disclosed through guidance, we examine the timing of when guidance is issued. We find that politically connected firms are more likely to issue guidance and change their government policy–related disclosures prior to the public revelation of government policy decisions. Collectively, these findings suggest that the privileged information firms obtain through their political connections is shared with investors through voluntary disclosures.
Introduction
A recent line of research investigates the role of differential access to material nonpublic information from policymakers in securities markets (e.g., Gao and Huang 2016; Christensen et al. 2017). Privileged access to the strategic details of upcoming hearings, current policy positions, and any potential amendments that others might offer (i.e., political information) is possible because members of Congress are legally permitted to selectively disclose such information to outside parties (see, e.g., Jerke 2010; Bainbridge 2011; Nagy and Painter 2012; Wright 1996). Provisions that would have required mandatory disclosure around the flow of political information were initially included in the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge (STOCK) Act (which passed in April 2012) but were removed prior to the final vote on the bill. A subsequent bill that aimed at addressing the lack of transparency around the flow of political information (the Political Intelligence Transparency Act of 2017) was introduced but not enacted, in part due to lack of evidence on how political information is disseminated, to whom, and for what purpose
Conclusions
In this study, we examine whether and how political information is disclosed to market participants. We document that firms that are politically connected are more likely to issue guidance and to include more policy-related terms in their guidance disclosures than politically unconnected firms, especially when the proprietary costs of disclosure are low. These findings are robust to various econometric techniques to control for the endogenous decision to become politically connected.