دانلود مقاله فرار مالیاتی با وجدان
چکیده
مقدمه
مقدماتی: یک بازی بازرسی
ادغام احساس گناه
تفسیر جمعیت
بازده خصوصی در مقابل عمومی
نتایج اظهار شده
منابع
Abstract
Introduction
Preliminary: An inspection game
Incorporating guilt
A Population interpretation
Private versus public returns
Concluding remarks
Reference
چکیده
چگونه نگرانی های اخلاقی بر تقلب و کشف تأثیر می گذارد، به عنوان مثال، رعایت مالیات و نیاز به حسابرسی؟ ما پاسخ‌هایی را با بررسی یک بازی بازرسی روان‌شناختی 2×1×2×1 پیشنهاد می‌کنیم که شامل احساس گناه، ناآگاهی، و تأثیرات مخاطب ثالث وابسته به باور است. نتیجه‌گیری‌های جدیدی در مورد رفتار افرادی که تحت‌تاثیر نگرانی‌های اخلاقی قرار می‌گیرند (این موضوع بیشتر مربوط به بازرس است تا بازرسی‌شونده) و همچنین موضوع سیاست مجاز به استفاده از یک اصل دسترسی عمومی که به موجب آن اظهارنامه‌های مالیاتی به اطلاعات عمومی تبدیل می‌شود، گرفته می‌شود.
توجه! این متن ترجمه ماشینی بوده و توسط مترجمین ای ترجمه، ترجمه نشده است.
Abstract
How do moral concerns affect fraud and detection, for example, tax compliance and the need for audits? We propose answers by exploring a psychological 2×1×2×1 inspection game which incorporates belief-dependent guilt, unawareness, and third-party audience effects. Novel conclusions are drawn regarding whose behavior is affected by moral concerns (it's the inspector's more than the inspectee's) as well as the policy issue whether to allow the use of a principle of public access whereby tax returns are made public information.
Introduction
A clear conscience may be a good pillow (as the proverb goes). Yet, this may not be enough to deter criminal behavior. Shoplifting, fare dodging, use of narcotics, reneged arms control treaties, embezzlement, corruption, moral hazard in insurance, and tax evasion happens. Law enforcement (or contracting partners) react by engaging in costly audits, inspections, raids, and crackdowns. The interaction is studied in the literature on inspection games.1 Mostly, no notion of integrity, virtue, or morale is invoked though. It is natural to wonder whether conclusions change if such matters are taken into account. We explore that issue, for a stylized and special setting.
Concluding remarks
Classify our contribution as “applied behavioral theory.” Drawing on Battigalli and Dufwenberg's (2007) (B&D) psychological games based approach, we explore how two forms of guilt may shape behavior in an inspection game. The analysis may have multiple interpretation although we chose to highlight and focus on a simple context involving tax evasion and the need for audits. The analysis highlights several novel, and perhaps unexpected, effects.
Intuition may suggest that if tax evaders feel guilty then they are more likely to comply. However, if a tax authority anticipates compliance that reduces the incentives for inspection, which in turn makes evasion more lucrative. The overall equilibrium effect is in most cases null for the taxpayer, while the authority inspects less. Guilt is beneficial, not by making people more honest but by reducing the need for audits.