دانلود مقاله زنان نمایانگر حقوق زنان
چکیده
ارتباطات بین بازنمایی توصیفی و محتوایی
سابقه و مشاغل سیاسی: فراتر از ایالات متحده
تبیین تنوع در نمایندگی بنیادی زنان: ارشدیت و امنیت قانونگذاری
داده ها و روش ها
تأثیر ارشدیت بر قوانین حقوق زنان
نتیجه گیری
منابع
Abstract
Connections between descriptive and substantive representation
Seniority and political careers: beyond the U.S.
Explaining variation in women’s substantive representation: seniority and legislative security
Data and methods
The effect of seniority on women’s rights legislation
Conclusion
References
چکیده
یک فرض قدیمی در ادبیات مربوط به نمایندگی زنان این است که پس از انتخاب، نمایندگان توصیفی به نمایندگی از منافع اساسی زنان قانون وضع خواهند کرد. در حالی که ادبیات از این ایده حمایت می‌کند که نمایندگان زن در رفتار قانونگذاری خود، منافع اساسی زنان را در اولویت قرار می‌دهند، تنوع قابل‌توجهی بین زنان در کشورها وجود دارد. در این مقاله، من یک عامل را بررسی می کنم که توضیح می دهد چرا برخی از زنان بیشتر از دیگران بر حقوق زنان تمرکز می کنند: احساس امنیت سیاسی و استقرار در داخل قوه مقننه. من استدلال می کنم که قانونگذاران زن با امنیت بیشتر در داخل قوه مقننه، که به عنوان ارشدیت سنجیده می شود، ممکن است در مقایسه با زنان جوان تر، سیاست های حقوق زنان را معرفی کنند. ارشدیت به قانونگذاران آزادی انحراف از پلتفرم حزب بدون ترس از واکنش رهبری حزب را می دهد. من این را با استفاده از داده های مربوط به لوایحی که توسط قانونگذاران آرژانتین (1983-2013) آغاز شده است، آزمایش می کنم. من متوجه شدم که زنان سالخورده بیشتری قوانین حقوق زنان را معرفی می کنند.
توجه! این متن ترجمه ماشینی بوده و توسط مترجمین ای ترجمه، ترجمه نشده است.
Abstract
A longstanding assumption in the literature on women’s representation is that, once elected, descriptive representatives will legislate on behalf of women’s substantive interests. While the literature finds support for the notion that women representatives prioritize women’s substantive interests in their legislative behavior, considerable variation exists across women within countries. In this paper, I explore one factor that explains why some women focus more on women’s rights than others: sense of political security and establishment within the legislature. I argue that women legislators with more security within the legislature, measured as seniority, may be more likely to introduce women’s rights policies when compared with more junior women. Seniority provides legislators freedom to deviate from the party platform without fear of backlash from party leadership. I test this using data on bills initiated by legislators in Argentina (1983–2013). I find that more senior women introduce more women’s rights legislation.
Introduction
In the 2003–2007 session of the Argentine Chamber of Deputies, Adriana Raquel Bortolozzi, a deputy representing the province of Formosa and Margarita Ferra de Bartol, representing San Juan province, were both elected from the Partido Justicialista (PJ), one of the major, left-leaning political parties in Argentina. While Adriana initiated six bills promoting the well-being of women, Margarita initiated none. This anecdote presents an important question: Why do some women act to promote women’s interests in office, while others do not? This question is supported by a large body of literature which has demonstrated that while women, on average, are more likely to represent women’s substantive policy interests in public office than men (Bratton 2005; Schwindt-Bayer 2006, 2010; Htun, Lacalle, and Micozzi 2013; Barnes 2016), we also know that women elected to positions of power vary greatly in the degree to which they bring women’s substantive interests onto the legislative agenda (Swers 2002; Dodson 2006; Beckwith 2007; Reingold 2008; Franceschet, Krook, and Piscopo 2012).
Conclusion
As women have increased their numbers in office over time, the groups of women elected to office are becoming more diverse. With greater individual variation among elected women, it is important to explore how variation among women may condition their behavior in office across a wide variety of legislative outcomes. I propose that individual-level variation among women might explain variation in the degree to which women represent women’s interests in their legislative work, a question that remains a largely unanswered puzzle in the literature on women’s representation. Using individual-level variation in legislative seniority, I offer an explanation for why some women will advocate on behalf of women’s rights while others are more constrained in their ability to do so. Specifically, I theorize that seniority will lead to variation in legislative behavior by providing women legislators a sense of security within the legislature that allows them to deviate from appeasing the party leadership. This should lead to a greater introduction of women’s rights bills among senior women.