تولید اکتیو شیلد رندم مبتنی بر الگوریتم دسته ماهی های مصنوعی
Abstract
1- Introduction
2- Background
3- AFSRHA design
4- Simulation results
5- Layout
6- Conclusion
References
Abstract
Active shield has already been a primitive sensor of security critical integrated circuits for detecting invasive attacks. Because of the complex topology structure, the active shield based on random Hamiltonian path has a high security level. However, the available generation algorithms of this random path have poor efficiency when shield area is large, restricting its application in integrated circuits. In this paper, a novel generation algorithm of random active shield is proposed using a modified artificial fish-swarm algorithm. By changing the random selection strategy of the generation process, the proposed algorithm makes each selection turn into a successful combination, thus improving the efficiency greatly. Simulations prove that this algorithm is seventeen times faster than the classical Cycle Merging algorithm, while keeping good randomness. Meanwhile, the proposed algorithm is capable of large shield generation. In a 0.18 μm CMOS process with the minimum top-metal width and space of 1.5 μm, the active shield with the area of 3 × 3 mm2 only needs approximately 2 h for generation.
Introduction
Invasive attacks have already been employed to extracting sensitive information from integrated circuits (ICs) (Anderson and Kuhn, 1996; Handschuh et al., 1999; Quadir et al., 2016; Van Tilborg and Jajodia, 2011). With the help of modern test equipment (Boit et al., 2013; Helfmeier et al., 2013), such as microprobing and focused ion beam (FIB) workstations, invasive attacks can be implemented directly on chips. Attackers can change the connections of internal wires (Ray, 2009), draw artificial pads conducting into the inner circuits and monitor the signals on data buses (Kömmerling and Kuhn, 1999; Weingart, 2000).Therefore, sensitive information like cryptographic keys can be obtained easily. Experiments have proved that these attacks can extract critical information from commercial chips (Tarnovsky, 2008). As a result, the devices and systems, such s computers, embedded devices and intelligent control systems, take integrated circuits as the cores. They have to face the fact that they are unsafe under the threats of invasive attacks. Various countermeasures (Beit-Grogger and Riegebauer, 2005; Briais et al., 2012a; 2012b; Helfmeier et al., 2012; Manich et al., 2012; Mishra et al., 2017; Ngo et al., 2017; Shi et al., 2016; Xin et al., 2019) are put forward to detect invasive attacks for protecting chips. Some special sensors, such as the capacitance sensor based on ring oscillator (Manich et al., 2012) and the charge sensor with an antenna (Helfmeier et al., 2012), cannot provide protection against microprobing and FIB attacks simultaneously. Particularly, active shield is an effective countermeasure which can resist both of the attacks.