جریان نقدی آزاد، محافظه کاری مشروط و هزینه های آژانس
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جریان نقدی آزاد، محافظه کاری مشروط و هزینه های آژانس

عنوان فارسی مقاله: هزینه های آژانس از جریان نقدی آزاد و محافظه کاری مشروط
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله: Agency costs of free cash flow and conditional conservatism
مجله/کنفرانس: پیشرفت در حسابداری - Advances In Accounting
رشته های تحصیلی مرتبط: حسابداری
گرایش های تحصیلی مرتبط: حسابداری مالی، حسابداری دولتی
کلمات کلیدی فارسی: هزینه های آژانس، محافظه کاری مشروط، دارایی های نقدی، جریان نقد آزاد
کلمات کلیدی انگلیسی: Agency costs، Conditional conservatism، Cash holdings، Free cash flow
نوع نگارش مقاله: مقاله پژوهشی (Research Article)
نمایه: Scopus - Master Journals List
شناسه دیجیتال (DOI): https://doi.org/10.1016/j.adiac.2019.04.002
دانشگاه: University of San Francisco, 2130 Fulton St, San Francisco, CA 94117, United States
ناشر: امرالد - Emeraldinsight
نوع ارائه مقاله: ژورنال
نوع مقاله: ISI
سال انتشار مقاله: 2019
ایمپکت فاکتور: 0/958 در سال 2019
شاخص H_index: 24 در سال 2020
شاخص SJR: 0/308 در سال 2019
شناسه ISSN: 0882-6110
شاخص Quartile (چارک): Q3  در سال 2019
فرمت مقاله انگلیسی: PDF
تعداد صفحات مقاله انگلیسی: 17
وضعیت ترجمه: ترجمه نشده است
قیمت مقاله انگلیسی: رایگان
آیا این مقاله بیس است: بله
آیا این مقاله مدل مفهومی دارد: دارد
آیا این مقاله پرسشنامه دارد: ندارد
آیا این مقاله متغیر دارد: دارد
کد محصول: E13305
رفرنس: دارای رفرنس در داخل متن و انتهای مقاله
فهرست انگلیسی مطالب

Abstract


1- Introduction


2- Previous literature and hypothesis development


3- Research design and sample selection


4- Empirical results


5- Conclusion


References

نمونه متن انگلیسی مقاله

Abstract


This study investigates whether agency costs of free cash flow (FCF) are associated with conditional conservatism. Prior research documents that conditional conservatism improves ex ante efficient investment decisions and facilitates ex post monitoring of managers’ investment decisions. As conditional conservatism can provide protection from possible managerial expropriation, the demand for conditional conservatism should increase with the agency costs of FCF. Using excess cash as a proxy for the agency costs of FCF, I provide evidence that firms with higher agency costs of FCF incorporate losses in a timelier manner relative to gains compared to their counterparts. Additionally, the association between excess cash and conditional conservatism predictably varies with the presence of alternative monitoring mechanisms that mitigate FCF problems, such as debt or dividend payouts or repurchases. Further investigation suggests that greater conservatism is associated with a lower likelihood of overinvestment among firms bearing high agency costs of FCF, demonstrating the ability of conservatism to reduce agency costs of FCF.


Introduction


This study investigates whether potential agency costs of free cash flow (FCF) affect a firm's level of conditional conservatism.1 Previous studies document that when companies are prone to overinvest, investors discount the value of cash and, consequently, the corporate value. Jensen (1986) refers to this type of loss of firm value as the agency costs of FCF, a type of agency costs between a manager and shareholders. Most prior studies focus on corporate governance as a monitoring mechanism for manager–shareholder agency conflict (Dittmar & Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, & Servaes, 2003; Pinkowitz & Williamson, 2007). However, governance structures are not designed ex ante to optimally mitigate agency problems and are not very responsive to demands arising from stakeholders (Richardson, 2006). Other than shareholder litigation, which is ex post in nature and very costly, there is no specific action that shareholders can take against possible managerial expropriation.2 Prior research provides ample evidence that asymmetrically timely loss recognition, otherwise known as conditional conservatism, serves as an ex ante safeguard against ex post managerial opportunism while at the same time being demand driven (e.g., Beatty, Weber, & Yu, 2008; Gao, 2013; Holthausen & Watts, 2001; LaFond & Roychowdhury, 2008; LaFond & Watts, 2008; Ramalingegowda & Yu, 2012; Watts, 2003a). Conditional conservatism imposes stricter verification standards for recognizing gains than for losses, which results in recognition of losses ahead of realization and a delay in the recognition of gains until realization. The requirement of conservative reporting makes the recognition of losses from overinvestments less likely to be deferred to the future, and ex ante knowledge that future losses in cash flows will be recognized in income in a timelier manner provides disincentives for managers who might otherwise undertake negative net present value (NPV) projects (Ball & Shivakumar, 2006). As conditional conservatism can provide protection from possible managerial expropriation, the demand for conditional conservatism should increase with the agency costs of FCF.

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