مدیران فاسد زن و کیفیت گزارشگری مالی
ترجمه نشده

مدیران فاسد زن و کیفیت گزارشگری مالی

عنوان فارسی مقاله: مدیران فاسد زن، کیفیت گزارشگری مالی و حق الزحمه های حسابرسی
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله: Female tainted directors, financial reporting quality and audit fees
مجله/کنفرانس: مجله حسابداری و اقتصاد معاصر – Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics
رشته های تحصیلی مرتبط: حسابداری
گرایش های تحصیلی مرتبط: حسابداری مالی، حسابرسی
کلمات کلیدی فارسی: مدیران فاسد زن، مدیریت درآمد واقعی، حق الزحمه های حسابرسی، کیفیت گزارشگری مالی
کلمات کلیدی انگلیسی: Female tainted director, real earnings management, audit fees, financial reporting quality
نوع نگارش مقاله: مقاله پژوهشی (Research Article)
شناسه دیجیتال (DOI): https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcae.2020.100189
دانشگاه: School of Accountancy, Massey University, New Zealand
صفحات مقاله انگلیسی: 42
ناشر: الزویر - Elsevier
نوع ارائه مقاله: ژورنال
نوع مقاله: ISI
سال انتشار مقاله: 2020
ایمپکت فاکتور: 1.184 در سال 2019
شاخص H_index: 15 در سال 2020
شاخص SJR: 0.527 در سال 2019
شناسه ISSN: 1815-5669
شاخص Quartile (چارک): Q2 در سال 2019
فرمت مقاله انگلیسی: PDF
وضعیت ترجمه: ترجمه نشده است
قیمت مقاله انگلیسی: رایگان
آیا این مقاله بیس است: بله
آیا این مقاله مدل مفهومی دارد: دارد
آیا این مقاله پرسشنامه دارد: ندارد
آیا این مقاله متغیر دارد: دارد
کد محصول: E14980
رفرنس: دارای رفرنس در داخل متن و انتهای مقاله
فهرست مطالب (انگلیسی)

Abstract

JEL Classification

۱٫ Introduction

۲٫ Literature review and hypotheses development

۳٫ Research design

۴٫ Multivariate test results

۵٫ Conclusions

Acknowledgments

Appendix A. Definitions of variables

References

بخشی از مقاله (انگلیسی)

Abstract

This paper examines the association between the presence of female tainted directors on corporate boards and audit committees and (1) financial reporting quality and (2) audit fees. Female tainted directors are defined as female directors who have been directors of the firms that have previously been involved in financial failures and integrity indiscretions. Using real earnings management and audit fees as proxies for effective governance and board reputation, we find that firms with female tainted directors have higher real earnings management and higher audit fees. However, since prior literature has demonstrated that audit fees are higher for firms with female directors because female directors demand better auditing, we corroborate a supply-side effect of auditors charging higher audit fees when female tainted directors exist. We demonstrate this by showing that while there is an association between audit fee and real earnings management, this association is higher for firms with female tainted directors. Arguably, the governance and reputational benefits of female directors on boards are negated if such directors have tarnished professional reputations.

Introduction

This paper deals with the impact of female tainted directors on corporate boards and audit committees on the financial reporting quality and audit fees of US-listed firms.2 Female representation on corporate boards has long been the subject of research and remains an important issue for academics, professionals and policy-makers. Many academic researchers have argued that men and women have different ethical orientations (Singh et al., 2002). Women are believed to have values and interests that make them more sensitive to unethical behaviour than men (Betz et al., 1989; Limerick and Field, 2003; Stedham et al., 2007). Accounting researchers have found that female directors have better oversight of managers (Adams and Ferreira, 2009) because they do not belong to the old-boy networks; this facilitates more independent thinking in decision making (Adams et al., 2010). Further, firms with female directors facilitate more informed discussion (Daily et al., 2000), which reduces information asymmetry and increases earnings quality (Srinidhi et al., 2011). While each of the abovementioned studies has its own merits, none of the previous gender diversity studies differentiate the ethical orientation of female directors. To ensure that we capture the ethical orientation of these directors, we draw our evidence from the actual professional history of each director, based on the definition stated above.