یک بازی کارآگاهی در حسابرسی داخلی و تاثیر سوت زنی
ترجمه نشده

یک بازی کارآگاهی در حسابرسی داخلی و تاثیر سوت زنی

عنوان فارسی مقاله: یک بازی کارآگاهی در حسابرسی داخلی و تاثیر سوت زنی
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله: An inspection game of internal audit and the infuence of whistle‑blowing
مجله/کنفرانس: مجله اقتصاد تجاری – Journal of Business Economics
رشته های تحصیلی مرتبط: حسابداری
گرایش های تحصیلی مرتبط: حسابرسی
کلمات کلیدی فارسی: سوت زدن، بازی کارآگاهی، بازی سه نفره
کلمات کلیدی انگلیسی: Whistle-blowing, Inspection game, Three-preson game
نوع نگارش مقاله: مقاله پژوهشی (Research Article)
نمایه: Scopus
شناسه دیجیتال (DOI): https://doi.org/10.1007/s11573-018-0893-9
دانشگاه: Department of Economics and Public Finance – University of Hagen – Germany
ناشر: اسپرینگر - Springer
نوع ارائه مقاله: ژورنال
نوع مقاله: ISI
سال انتشار مقاله: 2018
شاخص H_index: 9 در سال 2019
شاخص SJR: 0.437 در سال 2017
شناسه ISSN: 0044-2372
شاخص Quartile (چارک): Q2 در سال 2017
فرمت مقاله انگلیسی: pdf
تعداد صفحات مقاله انگلیسی: 32
وضعیت ترجمه: ترجمه نشده است
قیمت مقاله انگلیسی: رایگان
آیا این مقاله بیس است: خیر
کد محصول: E6814
فهرست انگلیسی مطالب

Abstract


1- Introduction


2- The benchmark auditor‑manager inspection game of internal control


3- The auditor‑manager inspection game of internal control with exogenous whistle‑blowing


4- The three‑person inspection game with endogenous whistle‑blowing


5- Conclusion and discussion


Appendix


References

نمونه متن انگلیسی مقاله

Abstract


In this paper we analyse how whistle-blowing afects fraudulent behaviour of managers while the company instigates imperfect internal audit to detect the fraud. To do so, we employ in a frst step a non-cooperative inspection game to analyse fraudulent behaviour of a manager controlled by an internal auditor. In a second step we introduce exogenous whistle-blowing of a manager’s employee to aid the auditor to reveal the fraud. In a third step, the two-person inspection game is extended to a three-person approach with endogenous whistle-blowing. Our novel results are that the intensity of internal audit is always lower with whistle-blowing than without and that whistle-blowing renders the manager to act less fraudulently than compared to the basic inspection game if and only if she is unaware of the whistle-blower’s expected pay-of and the efcacy of internal audit is sufciently low.


Introduction


By employing game theory, Fandel (1979) shows that the optimality of decision processes within organizations is a key factor in business processes. In the sense of e.g. Fandel and Trockel (2013), this optimality can be jeopardised by employees or managers who may strive to achieve individually optimal goals rather than targets that are optimal for the company as a whole and, hence, abuse the board’s trust in them, see Güth and Kliemt (2007). At this, Küpper (2007) stresses that companies are constantly confronted with moral problems as managers may fnd it acceptable to be corruptive or act fraudulently for their own good. Recent empirical evidences for this are the faked emission numbers of Volkswagen revealed in 2015, the LIBOR scandal disclosed in 2011 involving traders of e.g. the Deutsche Bank or the scandal of Siemens’ managers and sales staf bribing government ofcials. As a consequence, regulators and auditing standard boards have tried to improve corporate governance systems during the last years by means of defning compliance rules. Examples for this are the Dodd-Frank-Act (2010), the updated Internal Control Framework of the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (2013) or the three lines of defence model of The Institute of Internal Auditors (2013).

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