عواقب ناخواسته قانون طلاق بنفع زنان خانه دار
Abstract
1- Introduction
2- Background
3-Data
4- Methodology
5- Results
6- Conclusion
References
Abstract
This study identifies the impact of access to and the speed of divorce on the welfare of children in a middle income largely Catholic country. Using difference-in-difference estimation techniques, I compare school enrollment for children of married and cohabiting parent households before and after the legalization of divorce. Implementing pro-homemaker divorce laws increased school enrollment anywhere from 3.4 to 5.5 percentage points, and the effect was particularly salient on secondary school students. I provide evidence that administrative processes influencing the speed of divorce affect household bargaining and investments in schooling. With every additional six months wait to the finalization of divorce, school enrollment decreased by approximately one percentage point. The impact almost doubles for secondary schooling. When contemplating development policies, advocates, policymakers, and leaders should not overlook the impact changes in family policies and administrative processes can have on advancements in child welfare and, ultimately, economic development. (JEL: D12, D13, J12, I21, I25).
Introduction
Implementing development policies focused on improving child welfare can be expensive, time consuming, and, sometimes, ineffective (Filmer, 2003; Glewwe and Kremer, 2006; Ingram and Kessides, 1994). This is particularly true if the intervention is country-wide and focused on major activities like building infrastructure, purchasing supplies, or developing advocacy groups (Ingram and Kessides, 1994). Can alternative policy paths like changes to family law lead to major advancements in child welfare and, eventually, economic development? To study this, one needs a rarefied environment where a national policy is implemented with enough leverage to induce a redistribution of household resources in certain households, restrict the household’s ability to manipulate the magnitude or speed of the redistribution, and data overtime of those exposed and not exposed to the policy to estimate outcomes. I find a natural experiment environment close to this in Chile where gendered family norms are relatively rigid, geographic immobility is common, family legal procedures are tied to the local geography where one lives, local family court districts are independent, and a major policy shock – the legalization of divorce – happened in 2004. After almost a decade of intense national debate, the Chilean Congress passed a revised Civil Marriage Act in 2004. For the first time in the country’s history, Chileans could divorce.