دانلود مقاله سهامداری عمودی در طول شک های زنجیره تامین
خلاصه
1. معرفی
2. شواهد توصیفی
3. مدل های تجربی و نتایج اصلی
4. نتیجه گیری
قدردانی ها
ضمیمه. مواد تکمیلی
در دسترس بودن داده ها
منابع
Abstract
1. Introduction
2. Descriptive evidence
3. Empirical models and main results
4. Conclusion
Acknowledgments
Appendix. Supplementary materials
Data availability
References
چکیده
این مقاله بررسی می‌کند که آیا مالکیت مشترک در امتداد زنجیره‌های تامین (به عنوان مثال، سهامداری عمودی) با عملکرد بهتر شرکت در طول شوک زنجیره تامین مرتبط است یا خیر. ما متوجه شدیم که زوج های مشتری تامین کننده با سهام عمودی بازده ماهانه ترکیبی بالاتری را از زمان شیوع بیماری همه گیر COVID-19 گزارش می کنند. سرمایه گذاران مشترک اختصاصی بیشترین اثرات مثبت را دارند و پس از آن شبه شاخص های رایج قرار دارند.
Abstract
The paper examines whether common ownership along supply chains (i.e., vertical shareholding) is associated with better firm performance during supply chain shock. We find that supplier-customer dyads with vertical shareholding report higher combined monthly returns since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. The dedicated common investors have the most positive effects, followed by the common quasi-indexers.
Introduction
As overlapping institutional ownership becomes more prevalent, it has been heatedly debated whether it plays a positive role in market competition and corporate governance (e.g., Azar et al., 2018; Edmans et al., 2019; Schmalz 2021; Koch et al., 2021; Bebchuk and Hirst 2022). Most studies focus on its effects on industry rivals (i.e., horizontal shareholding). Compared to industry rivals, firms along the supply chain network have more collaborative and interdependent relationships. Hence, overlapping institutional ownership of supplier-customer dyads (i.e., vertical shareholding)1 may have distinct effects, especially in response to disruptive events that could jeopardize collaboration.
We utilize the COVID-19 pandemic as an exogenous supply chain shock to investigate whether vertical shareholding is associated with stock performance. Supply chain disruptions can be devastating to both upstream and downstream firms (e.g., Carvalho et al., 2021) and significantly exacerbate interfirm conflicts as opportunism and information asymmetry increase. Economic theories predict that cross-ownership can address inherent interfirm conflicts, such as the holdup problem (e.g., Klein et al., 1978; Grossman and Hart 1986). Institutional investors simultaneously holding shares of economically connected firms have incentives to prevent either contracting party from making a move that will hurt the value of their portfolios. Hence, they can influence the management of both upstream and downstream firms and thereby encourage information sharing and balance the bargaining power in supply chain contract renegotiations. For example, institutional investors can influence the supplier firms to prioritize the co-owned customer firms during supply shortages (Sheffi 2020).
Conclusion
We show that supply chain dyads with vertical shareholding have significantly better aggregate stock market performance since the COVID-19 pandemic. The effects vary with the incentives of common institutional shareholders. To our knowledge, we are one of the first empirical studies to show that vertical shareholding mitigates negative consequences of supply chain shocks. Our evidence sheds light on the debates over the roles common institutional investors play in interfirm relationships and supply chain risk management.