دانلود مقاله سرمایه اجتماعی و هزینه بدهی
خلاصه
1. معرفی
2. پیشینه، چارچوب های نظری و فرضیه ها
3. طرح تحقیق
4. نتایج و بحث
5. بحث
6. نتیجه گیری
بیانیه مشارکت نویسنده CRediT
اعلامیه منافع رقابتی
سپاسگزاریها
ضمیمه A. تعریف متغیر
در دسترس بودن داده ها
منابع
Abstract
1. Introduction
2. Background, theoretical frameworks and hypotheses
3. Research design
4. Results and discussion
5. Discussion
6. Conclusion
CRediT authorship contribution statement
Declaration of competing interest
Acknowledgements
Appendix A. Variable definition
Data availability
References
چکیده:
با استفاده از یک مجموعه داده منحصر به فرد شامل 6313 مشاهدات سال شرکت برای شرکت های فهرست شده چینی بین سال های 2008 و 2017، ما تأثیر سرمایه اجتماعی مدیر عامل بر هزینه بدهی را بررسی می کنیم. نتایج ما نشان می‌دهد که سرمایه اجتماعی مدیرعامل رابطه منفی با هزینه بدهی دارد و تأثیر سرمایه اجتماعی مدیر عامل در محیط‌هایی با درجه بازاریابی پایین یا اعتماد اجتماعی بیشتر از محیط‌هایی با درجه بالایی از بازاریابی یا اعتماد اجتماعی است. علاوه بر این، نتایج ما نشان می‌دهد که دو مکانیسم بالقوه، اقلام تعهدی اختیاری و کیفیت افشای اطلاعات، تأثیر سرمایه اجتماعی مدیرعامل بر هزینه بدهی را واسطه می‌کنند.
Abstract
Using a unique dataset comprising 6313 firm-year observations for Chinese listed firms between 2008 and 2017, we investigate the impact of CEO social capital on cost of debt. Our results show that CEO social capital is negatively related to cost of debt, and the impact of CEO social capital in environments with a low degree of marketization or social trust is more pronounced than in environments with a high degree of marketization or social trust. Moreover, our results reveal that two potential mechanisms, discretionary accruals and information disclosure quality, mediate the impact of CEO social capital on cost of debt.
Introduction
Research into social capital in the area of social economics emerged late last century (e.g., Coleman, 1988 ; Putnam, 1993 , Putnam, 1995 ; Knack and Keefer, 1997 ; Uzzi, 1997 ; Portes, 1998 ; Woolcock, 1998 ; Dasgupta, 2005 ; Fafchamps, 2006 ). Prior studies have acknowledged the significance of the personal social capital embedded in social networks for corporate commercial activities, including corporate financing ( Engelberg et al., 2012 ; Ferris et al., 2017 ; Huang and Shang, 2019 ; Jin et al., 2019 ), corporate investment ( Faleye et al., 2014 ; Fracassi, 2017 ), mergers and acquisitions ( Fracassi and Tate, 2012 ; El-Khatib et al., 2015 ), executive employment and compensation policies ( Hwang and Kim, 2009 ; Fracassi and Tate, 2012 ; Nguyen, 2012 ; Engelberg et al., 2013 ; Ferris et al., 2020 ), risk-taking and accounting practices ( Ferris et al., 2017 , Ferris et al., 2019 ; Panta, 2020 ), and litigation risk ( Zhang et al., 2023 ). Personal social capital embedded in social networks, especially the social capital of corporate executives, has a significant influence on corporate financing. Social capital enhances the trust between borrowers and lenders and increases risk-taking behavior as social capital is seen as an informal insurance. As invisible social credit and a conduit for the exchange of information, CEO social capital benefits corporate financing activities.
We are motivated to investigate the connect between CEO social capital and cost of debt due to the complex institutional background of network and the importance of debt financing in the context of China. Despite China's remarkable economic growth in recent decades, its financial and legal environments remain underdeveloped. Allen et al. (2005) suggest that in order to sustain this growth, China requires alternative governance mechanisms and informal institutional arrangements. In the Chinese context, China is characterized as a relationship-based society, where social capital embedded in social networks, known as “Guan Xi,” holds significant prevalence and complexity. These networks provide Chinese additional social resources such as information and status ( Song et al., 2012 ; Bian, 2019 ). For example, the CEOs and chairmen of Chinese non-state-owned firms use bank loans to raise funds through their political contacts ( Yu and Pan, 2008 ). Loan approvals and covenants for Chinese corporates are influenced by CEO social capital ( Shen et al., 2009 ; Xu and Li, 2016 ). CEO social capital is negatively associated with firm leverage and short-term debt ratio, and social capital lowers the need for corporate bank borrowing ( Huang and Shang, 2019 ), and the social capital benefits improving the quality of corporate loans ( Jin et al., 2019 ). These studies only reveal the impact of managerial social capital on corporate financing, while the research into the impact of CEO social capital on the cost of debt is relatively scarce, particularly in emerging markets such as China.
Conclusion
This study investigates the relationship between CEO's social capital and cost of debt. We posit that CEO's social capital offers incentives for CEOs to provide enhanced information transparency and quality, which lowers the monitoring costs for the borrowers, inducing reduced cost of debt. Additionally, CEO's social capital creates a sense of trust between the lenders and the borrowers due to the informal tie that social capital creates among the networks. Using a unique dataset consisting with 6313 firm-year observations from the firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange markets from 2008 to 2017, our results suggest that CEO's social capital reduces cost of debt in the context of China, and such effect is more pronounced when there is a lack of information verification from the regulators (i.e., marketization) and societal norm (i.e., social trust). Moreover, we find that CEO's social capital reduces cost of debt through the path of reduced discretionary accruals and information disclosure quality. Our results hold after a battery of robustness checks, including the three individual proxies (betweenness centrality, closeness centrality and degree centrality) for CEO social capital, the two alternative proxies for cost of debt, sample without political capital, excess social capital, the consideration of family business characteristics, the interactive effect of state-owned enterprises and endogeneity concerns.