شبکه اجتماعی، حاکمیت شرکتی و رانت خواهی در جبران خسارت مدیرعامل
ترجمه نشده

شبکه اجتماعی، حاکمیت شرکتی و رانت خواهی در جبران خسارت مدیرعامل

عنوان فارسی مقاله: شبکه اجتماعی، حاکمیت شرکتی و رانت خواهی در جبران خسارت مدیرعامل: شواهدی از مدل های اقتصادسنجی مکانی
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله: Social network, corporate governance, and rent extraction in CEO compensation: Evidence from spatial econometric models
مجله/کنفرانس: نقد و بررسی حسابداری بریتانیا - The British Accounting Review
رشته های تحصیلی مرتبط: حسابداری و مدیریت
گرایش های تحصیلی مرتبط: حسابداری مالی، حسابداری مدیریت، مدیریت اجرایی، مدیریت مالی، مهندسی مالی و ریسک
کلمات کلیدی فارسی: جبران خسارت CEO، رانت خواهی، همبستگی مکانی، شبکه اجتماعی، حاکمیت شرکتی
کلمات کلیدی انگلیسی: CEO Compensation - Rent extraction - Spatial correlation - Social network - Corporate governance
نوع نگارش مقاله: مقاله پژوهشی (Research Article)
شناسه دیجیتال (DOI): https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bar.2021.100987
دانشگاه: Beihang University, Beijing, China
صفحات مقاله انگلیسی: 27
ناشر: الزویر - Elsevier
نوع ارائه مقاله: ژورنال
نوع مقاله: ISI
سال انتشار مقاله: 2021
ایمپکت فاکتور: 4.556 در سال 2020
شاخص H_index: 62 در سال 2021
شاخص SJR: 1.103 در سال 2020
شناسه ISSN: 0890-8389
شاخص Quartile (چارک): Q1 در سال 2020
فرمت مقاله انگلیسی: PDF
وضعیت ترجمه: ترجمه نشده است
قیمت مقاله انگلیسی: رایگان
آیا این مقاله بیس است: بله
آیا این مقاله مدل مفهومی دارد: دارد
آیا این مقاله پرسشنامه دارد: ندارد
آیا این مقاله متغیر دارد: دارد
کد محصول: E15261
رفرنس: دارای رفرنس در داخل متن و انتهای مقاله
فهرست مطالب (ترجمه)

کلید واژه ها

1. مقدمه

2. بررسی ادبیات و فرضیه ها

3. طرح تحقیق

4. نتایج

5. خلاصه و نتیجه گیری

ضمیمه A. داده های تکمیلی

پیوست 1. آزمونهای مشخصات مدل فضایی

ضمیمه 2. درون زایی و رویکرد متغیرهای ابزاری در اقتصادسنجی فضایی

منابع

فهرست مطالب (انگلیسی)

Keywords

1. Introduction

2. Literature review and hypotheses

3. Research design

4. Results

5. Summary and conclusion

Appendix A. Supplementary data

Appendix 1. Spatial model specification tests

Appendix 2. Endogeneity and the Instrumental Variables Approach in Spatial Econometrics

References

بخشی از مقاله (انگلیسی)

1. Introduction

Among the controversies in corporate governance, perhaps none is more heated or widely debated across society than that of CEO pay (Larcker & Tayan, 2019). How CEO pay is determined, and the performance implications of CEO pay is an issue of first-order importance. Efficient contracting (Gabaix & Landier, 2008; Murphy, 1999) and managerial power (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004) have been advanced as the two main explanations for the high level of CEO compensation and the weak links between CEO compensation and firm performance. While both are widely accepted, neither explanation is fully consistent with the available evidence (Frydman & Jenter, 2010). Much remains to be known about the determinants of CEO pay (Core, Holthausen, & Larcker, 1999), and the precise channels by which executives and boards influence CEO pay (Engelberg, Gao, & Parsons, 2013).

Recent studies have documented that geography has significant effects on corporate decisions and outcomes.1 Kedia and Rajgopal (2009) find that geographically-proximate firms adopt similar policies in broad-based option grants. They argue that this arises because geographically-proximate firms are exposed to the same local market conditions and managers at neighbouring firms engage in social interactions. Dougal, Parsons, and Titman (2015) find a high correlation in the capital investment of neighbouring firms, even those in different industries. They suggest that one reason for correlated investment is that local social networks allow managers to share ideas. Parsons, Sulaeman, and Titman (2018) find that geographic variation in social norms accounts for a large proportion of the cross-sectional variation in financial misconduct across major US cities. The evidence from these and other studies on the role of geography suggests that CEO compensation may be correlated among neighbouring firms, over and beyond what economic fundamentals warrant. However, the existence of, reasons for, and consequences of spatial correlation in CEO compensation remain under-explored. Our paper aims to fill this gap.

An empirical challenge in investigating spatial effects in corporate decisions is that the interdependence in the cross section of neighbouring firms makes ordinary least squares (OLS) an inconsistent estimator.2 Prior studies typically regress a firm-level outcome variable, such as CEO compensation (Bouwman, 2013) and corporate investment (Dougal et al., 2015), on the weighted average of that variable corresponding to the neighbouring firms. This approach is problematic, because it overlooks the “spatial lag” among neighbouring firms, and the autoregressive disturbance term (Anselin, 1988). We address such endogeneity concerns by using spatial econometric models, which are well suited for handling both types of interdependence (Kelejian & Prucha, 1998, 1999).3 More importantly, by focusing on how spatial correlation in CEO pay is affected by CEOs’ local social networks, corporate governance, as well as managerial power, and by examining the performance implications of spatial correlation in CEO pay, we shed light on the nature and consequences of spatial spillovers in CEO pay.