مقاله انگلیسی تشدید سیاست های پولی، مقایسه اطلاعات حسابداری
Abstract
JEL classification
Keywords
1. Introduction
2. Theoretical analysis and hypotheses
3. Data and model
4. Empirical results and analysis
5. Further analysis
6. Conclusions
Declaration of Competing Interest
References
Abstract
Based on a macro and micro cross view, we empirically test the interactions among monetary policy, accounting information comparability, and investment efficiency with a sample of A-share listed firms in China from 2005 to 2019. We find that tightening monetary policy will aggravate underinvestment behavior, such as inefficient investment, while improvement in accounting information comparability can effectively mitigate the negative impact of tightening monetary policy on underinvestment, so as to improve firm investment efficiency. Further study shows that, in a period of monetary policy tightening, firms with high agency costs and high financing constraints can significantly reduce underinvestment by improving the comparability of accounting information, thus improving the investment efficiency of firms. After distinguishing the type of firm ownership (state-owned enterprises vs. private enterprises), we find that firms can reduce the effect of insufficient investment during a period of monetary tightening by improving the comparability of accounting information, which is more significant in the sample of private enterprises (PEs).
1. Introduction
Using a series of strict assumptions, such as complete information, no transaction cost, and zero-risk debt financing, some scholars have confirmed that a company’s internal financing and external financing are equivalent, the choice of financing mode does not affect the company’s investment behavior, and purely technical factors – such as future profitability and the capital cost of an investment project – are the only influencing factors that determine the value of a company and can maximize its value when it reaches an optimal investment level. However, this series of assumptions is difficult to achieve perfectly in reality. Trade friction caused by information asymmetry tends to cause a company’s actual value to deviate from the theoretical value in varying degrees in the capital market, which leads to inefficient investment. The inefficient investment includes underinvestment (projects with a positive net present value [NPV] are rejected) and overinvestment (projects with a negative NPV are carried out). This inefficient investment not only reduces the value of a firm at the micro level and hinders the development of the firm but also affects the efficiency of resource allocation in the entire economy at the macro level (Bian and Li, 2009), thus curbing sustainable and healthy development of the macro economy. Fig. 1 illustrates changes in the pattern of inefficient investment in China, in which the sample of listed firms with inefficient investment increased from 1,038 in 2005 to 3,159 in 2019, a rate of 204.335%, and the sample of listed firms with underinvestment was larger than that with overinvestment during the sample period, which indicates that underinvestment is more common than overinvestment. Therefore, it is of great theoretical research value to explore the reasons for low investment efficiency at firms and to reveal which factors can reverse underinvestment by firms and raise investment efficiency at listed firms.