اعتبار شرکت و انتخاب حسابرس
ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
PRIOR LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS
CONCLUSION
REFERENCES
Abstract
Purpose: the purpose of this paper is to investigate how companies’ reputation affects their selection of auditors.
Introduction
This study investigates how companies’ reputation affects their selection of auditors. Analytical research has demonstrated that reputation plays an important role in determining behavior and the impact of reputation on a player’s actions is referred as the reputation effect or the reputation mechanism (Weigelt and Camerer 1988). Researchers have shown that the reputation mechanism can effectively reduce agency problems and induce behavior that is in the interest of the principal, even without a formal contract (Wilson 1985; Weigelt and Camerer 1988).1 Consistent with this argument, empirical studies provide evidence that reputation concerns affect corporate behavior, motivating management to take actions that provide long-term benefits rather than focusing on actions that only favor short-term interests. Studies have found that high-reputation companies tend to maintain higher earnings quality and enjoy a lower cost of debt and a lower cost of equity capital (Anginer et al. 2011; Cao et al. 2012, 2014). Recent research also documents a positive association between company reputation and firm value (Filbeck and Preece 2003; Anderson and Smith 2006). Despite the increasing interest in company reputation and the growing body of reputation-related research, there has been limited research on the effect of reputation on companies’ financial reporting activities. Cao et al. (2012) document that higherreputation companies tend to maintain higher financial reporting quality. They also examine the channels through which company reputation affects financial reporting quality and find that higher-reputation companies pay higher audit fees. The evidence is consistent with the argument that higher-reputation companies have greater incentives to protect their financial reporting quality and are therefore willing to pay for more audit effort. In light of the prior research, we investigate another channel through which company reputation may affect financial reporting quality, that is, the selection of external auditors. Company reputation may influence auditor choice in two competing ways. On the one hand, reputation concerns motivate high-reputation companies to maintain and signal their high financial reporting quality. As a result, they may demand great levels of audit quality to protect their good reputations. On the other hand, the reputation effect can help reduce agency problems between owners and management and therefore reduce the demand for high-quality auditors to serve as an external monitoring function. Overall, existing theories provide alternative predictions about the effect of company reputation on the demand for high-quality auditors.