تأثیر انگیزه مسابقات بر روی ارائه مجدد امور مالی
ترجمه نشده

تأثیر انگیزه مسابقات بر روی ارائه مجدد امور مالی

عنوان فارسی مقاله: تأثیر انگیزه مسابقات بر روی ارائه مجدد امور مالی: شواهد از چین
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله: The Effect of Tournament Incentives on Financial Restatements: Evidence From China
مجله/کنفرانس: مجله بین المللی حسابداری - International Journal of Accounting
رشته های تحصیلی مرتبط: مدیریت
گرایش های تحصیلی مرتبط: مدیریت مالی، مدیریت کسب و کار، مدیریت اجرایی
کلمات کلیدی فارسی: انگیزه مسابقات، اصلاحیه های مالی، مدیر عامل شرکت، شرکت های دولتی (SOEs)، حاکمیت شرکتی
کلمات کلیدی انگلیسی: Tournament incentives، Financial restatements، CEO turnover، State-owned enterprises (SOEs)، Corporate governance
نوع نگارش مقاله: مقاله پژوهشی (Research Article)
شناسه دیجیتال (DOI): https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intacc.2018.05.002
دانشگاه: Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics - China
ناشر: الزویر - Elsevier
نوع ارائه مقاله: ژورنال
نوع مقاله: ISI
سال انتشار مقاله: 2018
ایمپکت فاکتور: 0/826 در سال 2017
شاخص H_index: 45 در سال 2019
شاخص SJR: 0/498 در سال 2017
شناسه ISSN: 0020-7063
شاخص Quartile (چارک): Q2 در سال 2017
فرمت مقاله انگلیسی: PDF
تعداد صفحات مقاله انگلیسی: 18
وضعیت ترجمه: ترجمه نشده است
قیمت مقاله انگلیسی: رایگان
آیا این مقاله بیس است: بله
کد محصول: E10771
فهرست انگلیسی مطالب

Abstract


1- Introduction


2- Institutional environment and executive compensation in China


3- Literature review and hypothesis development


4- Research design


5- Empirical analysis


6- Robustness tests


7- Concluding


References

نمونه متن انگلیسی مقاله

Abstract


In this study, we examine the association between tournament incentives and financial restatements in China. Prior research documents that tournament incentives have a positive impact on firm performance. However, an alternative view suggests that tournament incentives can also have detrimental effects on firm performance. Using a sample of Chinese listed companies for the years 2008–2015, we find that tournament incentives, in the form of large pay disparities, reduce the occurrence of both core and non-core financial restatements. This negative association is more pronounced for SOEs as compared to non-SOEs. We further document that the negative association between tournament incentives and financial restatements is related to CEO turnover, and is stronger if the successor CEO is recruited from within the organization. This research contributes to a better understanding of tournament incentives, as a corporate governance mechanism, in constraining the occurrence of financial restatements in a unique institutional setting where state ownership is pronounced.


Introduction


This paper examines the impact of tournament incentives on the occurrence of financial restatements in China. The separation of ownership and control gives rise to information asymmetries that managers may use to exploit outside individual shareholders (Berle & Means, 1991; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). To minimize such sub-optimal managerial actions, researchers have identified a number of pure market forces, such as product market competition (Alchian, 1950; Stigler, 1958), the market for corporate control (Manne, 1965), and labor market pressure (Fama, 1980). However, despite these market controls, there remains residual demand for additional governance measures, such as well-designed managerial compensation schemes: an explicit form of compensation. A substantial body of academic research has investigated the association between this form of compensation and firm performance in various countries (Aggarwal & Samwick, 2006; Baker, Jensen, & Murphy, 1988; Cheng & Firth, 2006; Conyon & He, 2011; Jensen & Murphy, 1990; Kaplan, 1994; Kato & Long, 2006; Mengistae & Colin Xu, 2004; Tang & Sun, 2014; Xin & Tan, 2009). However, an implicit compensation scheme in the form of rank-order tournaments also exists (Lazear & Rosen, 1981; Lin & Lu, 2009). Tournament theory views executives as competitors contesting for promotion, and the large pay gap between the CEO and other executives becomes the prize for the tournament (Bognanno, 2001; Eriksson, 1999; Kale, Reis, & Venkateswaran, 2009; Lazear & Rosen, 1981). A large pay disparity motivates non-CEO senior executives to work hard and to invest in firm-specific human capital and, thus, helps build a motivated pool of internal candidates for the CEO position. Such a pool of internal candidates increases the bargaining power of the board, thus fostering positive CEO actions. Therefore, this perspective predicts a positive association between pay disparity and firm performance (Kale etal., 2009), and a negative association between pay disparity and the cost of capital (Chen, Huang, & Wei, 2013).

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