ترکیب هیئت مدیره، مالکیت خانوادگی و استراتژی های مالکیت سهام خارجی
Abstract
1- Introduction
2- Context, theory and hypotheses
3- Research methods
4- Data analysis and results
5- Discussion and conclusions
References
Abstract
In much of the developing world, families represent the dominant form of firm ownership. This study investigates how this influences equity ownership strategies when firms venture abroad. Drawing on agency theory and institutional theory, we investigate the direct effect of board composition and family ownership on the equity-based ownership strategies of multinational enterprises (MNEs) in their affiliates, and how institutional distance may moderate this. Examining foreign affiliates of listed Turkish MNEs, we find that a high ratio of independent directors is negatively linked to levels of equity ownership of MNE affiliates. We also find that a high ratio of inside directors on the board is positively associated with the equity stake of MNEs in their affiliates. The significant interaction effect between board composition, family ownership and institutional distance helps explain the unexpectedly weak effects of institutional distance.
Introduction
How do families impact the internationalization activities of firms in which they hold a significant stake? This study investigates the effects of board composition and family ownership on the equity ownership strategies of multinational enterprises from emerging markets (EM MNEs) in their affiliates. Further, we assess the moderating effect of institutional distance on this relationship. MNEs may be subject to pressures from a range of different institutional regimes, reflecting both investor country of origin and where the foreign operations take place. There is an extensive literature on how MNEs behave abroad (Almond et al., 2005; Brewster, Wood, & Brookes, 2008), which has tended to concentrate on the relative infusion of policies and practices from the country of origin. Less attention has been accorded to the association between the MNE’s internal corporate governance mechanisms and foreign equity ownership (e.g. Rhoades & Rechner, 2001; Filatotchev, Strange, Piesse, & Lien, 2007; Musteen, Datta, & Herrmann, 2009; Filatotchev & Wright, 2011). Internal corporate governance reflects both institutions, and the strategies dominant owner interests adopt in response to them. When formal regulation is weak or uncertain, the nature of the latter is vested with particular importance. Whilst weaker institutional coverage may be associated with greater agency problems (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000), this does not preclude actors from improvising solutions that secure the best returns possible under the circumstances (Lane & Wood, 2012). Within an emerging market (EM) context, we explore how international investment strategies may be molded by corporate governance realities and dominant ownership forms. This study makes extensive use of recent advances in institutional theory and develops insights into the implications of family capitalism for key players. It further evaluates how internal corporate governance mechanisms intersect with external ones in imposing a specific agenda on the firm.