ترکیب هیئت مدیره، مالکیت خانوادگی و استراتژی های مالکیت سهام خارجی
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ترکیب هیئت مدیره، مالکیت خانوادگی و استراتژی های مالکیت سهام خارجی

عنوان فارسی مقاله: ترکیب هیئت مدیره، مالکیت خانوادگی، فاصله نهادی و استراتژی های مالکیت سهام خارجی شرکت های چند ملیتی ترکیه
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله: Board composition, family ownership, institutional distance and the foreign equity ownership strategies of Turkish MNEs
مجله/کنفرانس: مجله تجارت جهانی - Journal of World Business
رشته های تحصیلی مرتبط: مدیریت، اقتصاد، حسابداری
گرایش های تحصیلی مرتبط: مدیریت مالی، مدیریت کسب و کار، مدیریت اجرایی، اقتصاد مالی، حسابداری مالی
کلمات کلیدی فارسی: ترکیب هیئت مدیره، استراتژی مالکیت سهام خارجی، تجارت خانوادگی، نظریه نمایندگی، نظریه نهادی، موسسات، شرکت های چند ملیتی در حال ظهور، ترکیه
کلمات کلیدی انگلیسی: Board composition، Foreign equity ownership strategy، Family business، Agency theory، Institutional theory، Institutions، Emerging MNEs، Turkey
نوع نگارش مقاله: مقاله پژوهشی (Research Article)
نمایه: Scopus - Master Journal List - JCR
شناسه دیجیتال (DOI): https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jwb.2018.07.006
دانشگاه: Department of Business Administration, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Karadeniz Technical University, Trabzon, 61080, Turkey
ناشر: الزویر - Elsevier
نوع ارائه مقاله: ژورنال
نوع مقاله: ISI
سال انتشار مقاله: 2018
ایمپکت فاکتور: 3/804 در سال 2017
شاخص H_index: 87 در سال 2019
شاخص SJR: 1/722 در سال 2017
شناسه ISSN: 1090-9516
شاخص Quartile (چارک): Q1 در سال 2017
فرمت مقاله انگلیسی: PDF
تعداد صفحات مقاله انگلیسی: 18
وضعیت ترجمه: ترجمه نشده است
قیمت مقاله انگلیسی: رایگان
آیا این مقاله بیس است: بله
کد محصول: E10958
فهرست انگلیسی مطالب

Abstract


1- Introduction


2- Context, theory and hypotheses


3- Research methods


4- Data analysis and results


5- Discussion and conclusions


References

نمونه متن انگلیسی مقاله

Abstract


In much of the developing world, families represent the dominant form of firm ownership. This study investigates how this influences equity ownership strategies when firms venture abroad. Drawing on agency theory and institutional theory, we investigate the direct effect of board composition and family ownership on the equity-based ownership strategies of multinational enterprises (MNEs) in their affiliates, and how institutional distance may moderate this. Examining foreign affiliates of listed Turkish MNEs, we find that a high ratio of independent directors is negatively linked to levels of equity ownership of MNE affiliates. We also find that a high ratio of inside directors on the board is positively associated with the equity stake of MNEs in their affiliates. The significant interaction effect between board composition, family ownership and institutional distance helps explain the unexpectedly weak effects of institutional distance.


Introduction


How do families impact the internationalization activities of firms in which they hold a significant stake? This study investigates the effects of board composition and family ownership on the equity ownership strategies of multinational enterprises from emerging markets (EM MNEs) in their affiliates. Further, we assess the moderating effect of institutional distance on this relationship. MNEs may be subject to pressures from a range of different institutional regimes, reflecting both investor country of origin and where the foreign operations take place. There is an extensive literature on how MNEs behave abroad (Almond et al., 2005; Brewster, Wood, & Brookes, 2008), which has tended to concentrate on the relative infusion of policies and practices from the country of origin. Less attention has been accorded to the association between the MNE’s internal corporate governance mechanisms and foreign equity ownership (e.g. Rhoades & Rechner, 2001; Filatotchev, Strange, Piesse, & Lien, 2007; Musteen, Datta, & Herrmann, 2009; Filatotchev & Wright, 2011). Internal corporate governance reflects both institutions, and the strategies dominant owner interests adopt in response to them. When formal regulation is weak or uncertain, the nature of the latter is vested with particular importance. Whilst weaker institutional coverage may be associated with greater agency problems (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000), this does not preclude actors from improvising solutions that secure the best returns possible under the circumstances (Lane & Wood, 2012). Within an emerging market (EM) context, we explore how international investment strategies may be molded by corporate governance realities and dominant ownership forms. This study makes extensive use of recent advances in institutional theory and develops insights into the implications of family capitalism for key players. It further evaluates how internal corporate governance mechanisms intersect with external ones in imposing a specific agenda on the firm.

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