نقش حاکمیت شرکتی و رقابت در بازار محصول
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نقش حاکمیت شرکتی و رقابت در بازار محصول

عنوان فارسی مقاله: سهام بیش ارزش گذاری شده پیش بینی شده و گذشته نگر: نقش حاکمیت شرکتی و رقابت در بازار محصول
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله: Ex ante and ex post overvalued equities: The roles of corporate governance and product market competition
مجله/کنفرانس: بررسی مدیریت آسیا-اقیانوسیه - Asia Pacific Management Review
رشته های تحصیلی مرتبط: اقتصاد، مدیریت
گرایش های تحصیلی مرتبط: مدیریت مالی، اقتصاد مالی
کلمات کلیدی فارسی: حاکمیت شرکتی، مدیریت سود، سهام بیش از حد ارزش، ارزش گذاری قیمت و درآمد، رقابت بازار محصول
کلمات کلیدی انگلیسی: Corporate governance، Earnings management، Over-valued equities، Price-earnings valuation، Product market competition
نوع نگارش مقاله: مقاله پژوهشی (Research Article)
نمایه: Scopus - Master Journal List
شناسه دیجیتال (DOI): https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apmrv.2017.07.002
دانشگاه: Department of Finance, National University of Kaohsiung, Kaohsiung, Taiwan
ناشر: الزویر - Elsevier
نوع ارائه مقاله: ژورنال
نوع مقاله: ISI
سال انتشار مقاله: 2018
ایمپکت فاکتور: 0/86 در سال 2017
شاخص H_index: 9 در سال 2019
شاخص SJR: 0/231 در سال 2017
شناسه ISSN: 1029-3132
شاخص Quartile (چارک): Q3 در سال 2017
فرمت مقاله انگلیسی: PDF
تعداد صفحات مقاله انگلیسی: 13
وضعیت ترجمه: ترجمه نشده است
قیمت مقاله انگلیسی: رایگان
آیا این مقاله بیس است: بله
کد محصول: E10974
فهرست انگلیسی مطالب

Abstract


1- Introduction


2- Related literature and hypotheses


3- Data source and variable definition


4- Does ex ante overvaluation measure identify overvaluation ex post?


5- Trading strategies based on the ex ante overvaluation


6- The effect of corporate governance and product market competition on ex ante and ex post overvaluation


7- Robustness tests


8- Conclusion


References

نمونه متن انگلیسی مقاله

Abstract


This paper examines equity overvaluation and the effects of corporate governance and product market competition on market valuation of potentially overvalued equities in an economy with high earnings management and weak investor protection (Taiwan). We follow Beneish and Nicholas (2009) to mimic Altman Z-Score and Beneish M-Score to compose an ex ante O-Score to measure overvaluation. We show that our ex ante overvaluation measure (O-Score) can effectively identify those that are likely to be overvalued by manipulation. Portfolios of longing stocks with high current O-Score and shorting stocks with low current O-Score earn abnormal returns. Portfolios of longing stocks with high one-year-ahead O-Score and shorting stocks with low one-year-ahead O-Score suffer losses. We also show that corporate governance reduces but product market competition raises managers’ incentive to manipulate market overvaluation. Moreover, product market competition reduces market valuation on currently overvalued equities. Corporate governance effectively reduces but product market competition reinforces the reverse effect of one-year-ahead overvaluation on current market valuation.


Introduction


Jensen (2005) indicates that equity overvaluation means that a firm's stock prices are higher than its fundamental value and argues that agency costs of overvalued equity cause the future destruction of firm value. Miller (1977) argues that overvaluation arises from investors' disagreement on the payoff of the financial assets. Shleifer and Vishny (1997a) argue that even if short-selling is allowed, the substantial risks of short selling reduce short-sellers’ incentives to borrow. Previous studies related to equity overvaluation focus on ex post overvalued equities, mostly on how overvalued firms take corporate actions or value-destroying activities to sustain overvaluation (see Chi and Gupta (2009), Houmes and Skantz (2010), Badertscher (2011), and among others). Little literature ever attempts to identify ex ante overvalued equities and/ or to trade on ex ante overvalued equities to make profits, especially in an economy with high earnings management and weak investor protection. Similar to Beneish (1999) M-score to detect ex ante earnings management, Beneish and Nicholas (2009) propose an O-score to identify U.S. overvalued equity ex ante through the assessment of financial statement information and the value-destroying financing activities. This paper attempts to fill the lack of literature of ex ante equity overvaluation. We examine whether the Beneish and Nicholas's O-score can be applied to identify overvalued equity in a high earnings management and weak investor protection economy (such as Taiwan) and examine how corporate governance and product market competition influence managers' motivation to manipulate overvaluation of equities and the market reaction to the overvaluation.

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