برداشت سرمایه گذاران غیرحرفه ای از اصلاحات جزئی نقاط ضعف کنترل IT و غیر IT
ترجمه نشده

برداشت سرمایه گذاران غیرحرفه ای از اصلاحات جزئی نقاط ضعف کنترل IT و غیر IT

عنوان فارسی مقاله: برداشت سرمایه گذاران غیرحرفه ای از اصلاحات جزئی نقاط ضعف کنترل IT و غیر IT: یک تحقیق تجربی
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله: Nonprofessional investor perceptions of the partial remediation of IT and non-IT control weaknesses: An experimental investigation
مجله/کنفرانس: International Journal of Accounting Information Systems
رشته های تحصیلی مرتبط: مدیریت، اقتصاد، حسابداری
گرایش های تحصیلی مرتبط: مدیریت فناوری اطلاعات، اقتصاد مالی، حسابداری مالی
کلمات کلیدی فارسی: ضعف عمده کنترل داخلی، ساربنز – آکسلی 404، نقاط ضعف IT، گزارشات کنترل نامطلوب، اصلاحات جزئی
کلمات کلیدی انگلیسی: Internal control material weakness, SOX 404, IT weaknesses, Adverse control reports, Partial remediation
نوع نگارش مقاله: مقاله پژوهشی (Research Article)
شناسه دیجیتال (DOI): https://doi.org/10.1016/j.accinf.2017.12.001
دانشگاه: Department of Accounting, University of New Orleans, 2000 Lakeshore Dr. KH 478, New Orleans, LA 70148, United States
صفحات مقاله انگلیسی: 17
ناشر: الزویر - Elsevier
نوع ارائه مقاله: ژورنال
نوع مقاله: ISI
سال انتشار مقاله: 2018
ایمپکت فاکتور: 1.375 در سال 2017
شاخص H_index: 42 در سال 2019
شاخص SJR: 0.399 در سال 2017
شناسه ISSN: 1467-0895
شاخص Quartile (چارک): Q2 در سال 2017
فرمت مقاله انگلیسی: PDF
وضعیت ترجمه: ترجمه نشده است
قیمت مقاله انگلیسی: رایگان
آیا این مقاله بیس است: بله
کد محصول: E11908
فهرست مطالب (انگلیسی)

Abstract
1. Introduction
2. Background and hypotheses development
3. Method
4. Results
5. Discussion and conclusion
Appendix
References

بخشی از مقاله (انگلیسی)

Abstract

In this study, we investigate whether nonprofessional investors' judgments about a firm with known and disclosed material weaknesses in internal control as required by the Sarbanes Oxley (SOX) Act of 2002 depend on the remediation strategy used by the firm. Analysis of SOX internal control weakness disclosures reveals that firms (1) often have multiple internal control weaknesses, (2) frequently have a mix of information technology (IT) and non-IT control weaknesses, and (3) invariably fail to remediate all control weaknesses in the period they are identified. We design an experiment to investigate how nonprofessional investors respond to remediation of a subset of disclosed material weaknesses in internal control, when a firm discloses a remediation plan that prioritizes the remediation of an IT (non-IT) internal control weakness leaving a non-IT (IT) weakness unremediated. We apply counterfactual theory to the future oriented remediation setting and find that investors favor a firm remediation strategy that prioritizes the remediation of an IT weakness over a strategy that prioritizes the remediation of a non-IT weakness. We further find that perceived effectiveness of remediation, financial misstatement risk attributed to the unresolved internal control weakness, and management credibility fully mediate the relation between company remediation strategies and investing judgments. These findings should be informative to both auditors and management when confronted with a range of IT and non-IT internal control weaknesses following the initial identification and disclosure of multiple material weaknesses as required by SOX.

Introduction

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 mandates that publicly traded companies report on the effectiveness of internal controls over financial reporting in the annual 10-K report to investors (SEC, 2003). When deficiencies in internal control have a material effect on the financial statements, as determined by management and the auditor, these control deficiencies are considered “material weaknesses” and must be disclosed in a specified section of the annual report (10-K), commonly referred to as the SOX 404 report.