پیش درامدی برای اصلاحات و بودجه بندی برای هزینه های اجباری
INTRODUCTION
BUDGETARY ACCOUNTING FOR FEDERAL RETIREMENT
DEFENSE OF CURRENT BUDGETARY ACCOUNTING, REASSESSED
PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNTING FOR MANDATORY SPENDING
EFFECTS OF ACCOUNTING CHANGE FOR CSRSF AND OASDI ON PROGRAM COSTS, DEFICIT, AND DEBT
SOME POTENTIAL CRITICISMS OF THE PROPOSAL
CONCLUDING COMMENT
REFERENCES
INTRODUCTION
Under current U.S. budget policy, federal debt/GDP is projected to rise without foreseeable limit (Congressional Budget Office [CBO] 2018). This path implies commensurate future net taxes, increases risk of debt-driven fiscal crises, restricts the ability of government to respond to future shocks and changed priorities, lowers standards of living, and increases the chances that government will rely more heavily on newly created money to finance its obligations. Those outcomes threaten economic, political, and social stability (Burman et al. 2010; CBO 2018). A proximate driver of rising debt under current law is the growth in mandatory spending, which constitutes about twothirds of federal outlays, up from 25 percent in 1962 (Office of Management and Budget [OMB] 2017). Those payments are largely for Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, federal civilian and military pensions, other post-employment benefits, and various safety net and insurance programs. Mandatory spending grows with the number of eligible beneficiaries and prices, without further action by the Congress. The procedural automaticity of mandatory spending often prompts Members and observers to complain that growth in those programs is “walled off” from budget decisions. Although the Congress and the Executive Office of the President are aware of the risks of current policy, they procrastinate. Indeed, they are more inclined to cut taxes and increase spending than to address the existing imbalance. Delaying a corrective response is problematic because adjusting fiscal course sooner rather than later would reduce the excess burden of uncertainty from government indecision (Gomez, Kotlikoff, and Viceira 2012), increase efficiency in terms of smoothed tax rates and consumption (Shaviro 2009), and require a smaller change with lower transition costs (e.g., Blahous 2016). In a world of consistently rational, high-energy agents and principals, devoid of weak self-control, present bias, or cognitive limitation, inaction would be an informed, mindful choice. Neither accounting nor other features of the budget process would affect decisions. Agents would “see through” accounting veils and other process distortions to the underlying reality and make the same.