بحران مالی به عنوان یک علامت خطر و عملکرد بانک در اقتصاد نوظهور
Abstract
1- Introduction
2- Theoretical background, literature review and hypotheses development
3- Data and methodology
4- Findings and analysis
5- Conclusion
References
Abstract
Purpose - This paper aims to investigate the effects of different sets of corporate governance (CG) practices on bank performance before, during and after the financial crisis. The study proposes some policy measures for improved CG practices to protect banks from the detrimental effects of future financial crises and economic meltdowns in the context of emerging markets such as Kazakhstan. Design/methodology/approach - The study analyses data from all commercial banks listed in Kazakhstan Stock Exchange for the pre-economic crisis, during the crisis and after the economic crisis periods. The study uses the panel regression model to control unobserved time-constant heterogeneity.
Findings - The study found that better CG practices led to better operating performance of the banks after the financial crisis periods. The changes in CG codes, board structures, disclosure requirements and board members’ competencies over time had a significant influence on CG practices and subsequently improved operating performance of the banks.
Originality/value - This is one of the first studies to examine the effects of CG practices on bank performance in central Asian transition economies, which are still heavily influenced by Soviet heritage and legacy.
Introduction
This paper investigates the effects of corporate governance (CG) practices on bank performance in Kazakhstan before, during and after the recent financial crisis. The impact of CG on accounting and market performance is still a subject of debate in the academic literature. Prior studies on the relationship between CG practices and firm performance have provided mixed results. Al-Hussein and Johnson (2009), Gompers et al. (2003), Jackling and Johl (2009), Orazalin et al. (2016) and Wang et al. (2012) provide evidence that effective CG leads to better firm performance. Other studies, across a range of market settings, provide no conclusive evidence that better CG improves firm performance (Bhagat and Bolton, 2008; Core et al., 2006). This indicates that global investors still remain skeptical about the strong and positive association between CG and performance measurements. The relationships between CG practices and organizational performance in developed capitalist countries with stable economic conditions are well-documented in research (De Haan and Vlahu, 2016; Wang et al., 2012). However, in transition economies, where governments frequently initiate institutional reforms to improve CG measures, the effects of different sets of CG practices on organizational performance in times of economic uncertainties and financial crises have not been incontestably validated to date (Haß et al., 2016; Liu et al., 2012).