دانلود مقاله فرار مالیاتی شرکت های رشوه خوار
Abstract
JEL classification
۱٫ Introduction
۲٫ The model
۳٫ Equilibrium
۴٫ Comparative statics
۵٫ Welfare
۶٫ Conclusion
Appendix A. Supplementary materials
Research Data
References
Abstract
Using an R&D-based growth model with dual regulation, we analyse how environmental policies influence pollution, corruption, a growth rate, and welfare. Considering that polluting firms bribe bureaucrats to evade paying environmental tax, we find that a stricter environmental tax leads to a decrease in growth rate via a decrease in the permit rent as well as an increase in pollution and corruption per firm and results in worsening households’ welfare and in improving the bureaucrats’ welfare. Thus, tax evasion with corruption improves households’ welfare and worsens the bureaucrats’ welfare. Our findings imply that tax evasion under dual regulation improves social welfare.
Introduction
With worsening climate, more EU member states are participating in the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU-ETS). Thus, a dual regulation problem is created, whereby firms emitting greenhouse gases are subjected to overlapping regulations: environmental taxes and emissions permit trading. However, industries in the EU have resisted these regulations because such overlapping regulations for the same pollution impose additional costs on firms (Sorrel, 2002). The additional costs from dual regulation may incentivise firms to evade environmental taxes through corruption. The government suffers from corruption, which damages the efficiency of environmental policies. This is because the weakening of environmental regulations as a result of corruption may inhibit economic development and increase pollution (Pellegrini and Gerlagh, 2006). In developing countries, corrupt officials demand bribes from firms in return for overlooking the under-reporting of pollution emissions. Previous studies show that polluting firms evade environmental tax via corruption (i.e. Damania, 2002; Iskandar et al., 2014). Thus, tax evasion with corruption may slow economic development and worsen environmental quality if there is tax evasion in developed countries. Environmental tax evasion is not expected in developed countries. However, European Union (EU) member states such as the United Kingdom (Customs, 2011) report that polluting firms do engage in environmental tax evasion. Thus, in contrast to developing countries, dual regulation in developed countries detrimentally affects the efficiency of emissions permit-trading via tax evasion with corruption.