بهره وری قیمت گذاری عرضه اولیه عمومی
ترجمه نشده

بهره وری قیمت گذاری عرضه اولیه عمومی

عنوان فارسی مقاله: چگونه یک کمیته حسابرسی قبل از عرضه اولیه عمومی (IPO) بهره وری قیمت گذاری عرضه اولیه عمومی (IPO) را در اقتصاد با عدم اطمینان ارزش کم و عدم تقارن اطلاعات بهبود می بخشد
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله: How a pre-IPO audit committee improves IPO pricing efficiency in an economy with little value uncertainty and information asymmetry
مجله/کنفرانس: مجله بانکداری و دارایی – Journal of Banking & Finance
رشته های تحصیلی مرتبط: حسابداری، اقتصاد
گرایش های تحصیلی مرتبط: حسابرسی، حسابداری مالی، اقتصاد مالی
کلمات کلیدی فارسی: کمیته حسابرسی، کیفیت گزارشگری مالی، عرضه عمومی اولیه، تخفیف قیمت، قیمت گذاری کم، قدرت چانه‌زنی بیمه گران
کلمات کلیدی انگلیسی: Audit committee، Financial reporting quality، Initial public offerings، Price discount، Underpricing، Underwriter bargaining power
نوع نگارش مقاله: مقاله پژوهشی (Research Article)
شناسه دیجیتال (DOI): https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2019.105688
دانشگاه: Department of Finance, National University of Kaohsiung, Kaohsiung 811, Taiwan
صفحات مقاله انگلیسی: 15
ناشر: الزویر - Elsevier
نوع ارائه مقاله: ژورنال
نوع مقاله: ISI
سال انتشار مقاله: 2020
ایمپکت فاکتور: 2.531 در سال 2018
شاخص H_index: 135 در سال 2019
شاخص SJR: 1.599 در سال 2018
شناسه ISSN: 0378-4266
شاخص Quartile (چارک): Q1 در سال 2018
فرمت مقاله انگلیسی: PDF
وضعیت ترجمه: ترجمه نشده است
قیمت مقاله انگلیسی: رایگان
آیا این مقاله بیس است: بله
آیا این مقاله مدل مفهومی دارد: ندارد
آیا این مقاله پرسشنامه دارد: ندارد
آیا این مقاله متغیر دارد: دارد
کد محصول: E14129
رفرنس: دارای رفرنس در داخل متن و انتهای مقاله
فهرست مطالب (انگلیسی)

Abstract

۱٫ Introduction

۲٫ Literature review

۳٫ Institutional features and the role of audit committees in Taiwan

۴٫ Data source and variable definitions

۵٫ Informativeness of ESM prices

۶٫ Audit committee and IPO pricing

۷٫ Conclusion

Appendix: Articles related to role of lawsuit of an audit committee of Company Act in Taiwan

References

بخشی از مقاله (انگلیسی)

Abstract

We examine the effect of a pre-IPO audit committee on IPO pricing from the perspectives of information asymmetry and agency problems. We propose a bargaining power hypothesis to disentangle the information asymmetry explanation (financial reporting quality) from the agency problems explanation (underwriter bargaining power) on IPO pricing. IPO underpricing can be reduced by increasing the financial reporting quality under information asymmetry and/or by decreasing the underwriter bargaining power under agency problems. An audit committee can raise the quality of financial reporting and reduce the bargaining power of underwriters. With a pre-IPO market, the IPO markets in Taiwan have little information asymmetry, thus leading to the weak importance of reducing information asymmetry. We show that the establishment of a pre-IPO audit committee improves IPO pricing efficiency by reducing underwriter bargaining power rather than by raising the quality of financial reporting in Taiwan.

Introduction

An initial public offering (IPO) is the process of offering shares of a firm that is transitioning from private to public status by selling stocks to a large number of diversified investors. Although information is disclosed in the IPO prospectus, it is still difficult to value an IPO because no price history is available for firms before going public. Because of the value uncertainty of IPO firms, investors cannot fully identify high-value IPOs from low-value IPOs. Leland and Pyle (1977) argue that investors benefit from knowing the true information of the issuers. However, moral hazard hampers the truthful release of information from issuers to investors. Issuers gain substantial rewards by exaggerating positive information. To overcome the existence of substantial information asymmetry between them and investors, issuers must reveal information and credible signals to the market. The best-known anomaly of IPOs is the underpricing of IPO shares that are listed for the first time. Lowry et al. (2017) indicate that most of the fundamental models of IPO underpricing focus on information asymmetry. Because of the heterogeneity of skills among investors, some investors obtain more information on the issuing firms than do other investors (Rock (1986); Amihud et al. (2003)).