سیستم بانکداری اسلامی
ترجمه نشده

سیستم بانکداری اسلامی

عنوان فارسی مقاله: ارتباط مقررات-ریسک پذیری تحت فشار رقابتی: سیستم بانکداری اسلامی چیست؟
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله: The regulations–risk taking nexus under competitive pressure: What about the Islamic banking system?
مجله/کنفرانس: تحقیقات در تجارت بین المللی و امور مالی - Research In International Business And Finance
رشته های تحصیلی مرتبط: اقتصاد، مدیریت
گرایش های تحصیلی مرتبط: بانکداری، بانکداری اسلامی، مدیریت مالی، اقتصاد مالی، اقتصاد پول و بانکداری، توسعه اقتصادی و برنامه ریزی، مهندسی مالی و ریسک
کلمات کلیدی فارسی: قدرت بازار، نمره Z، وام های ناکارمد، مقررات بانکی، بانک های اسلامی
کلمات کلیدی انگلیسی: Market power، Z-score، Nonperforming loans، Banking regulations، Islamic banks
نوع نگارش مقاله: مقاله پژوهشی (Research Article)
نمایه: Scopus - Master Journals List - JCR
شناسه دیجیتال (DOI): https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ribaf.2019.101074
دانشگاه: Faculty of Economics and Management of Sfax, Airport Road Km 4, 3018, Sfax, Tunisia
صفحات مقاله انگلیسی: 17
ناشر: الزویر - Elsevier
نوع ارائه مقاله: ژورنال
نوع مقاله: ISI
سال انتشار مقاله: 2020
ایمپکت فاکتور: 1/620 در سال 2019
شاخص H_index: 31 در سال 2020
شاخص SJR: 0/647 در سال 2019
شناسه ISSN: 0275-5319
شاخص Quartile (چارک): Q2 در سال 2019
فرمت مقاله انگلیسی: PDF
وضعیت ترجمه: ترجمه نشده است
قیمت مقاله انگلیسی: رایگان
آیا این مقاله بیس است: خیر
آیا این مقاله مدل مفهومی دارد: ندارد
آیا این مقاله پرسشنامه دارد: ندارد
آیا این مقاله متغیر دارد: دارد
کد محصول: E14386
رفرنس: دارای رفرنس در داخل متن و انتهای مقاله
فهرست مطالب (انگلیسی)

Abstract

1- Introduction

2- Literature review

3- Variable selection and data

4- Empirical approach

5- Empirical analysis

6- Conclusion

References

بخشی از مقاله (انگلیسی)

Abstract

Does market power condition the effect of bank regulations and supervision on bank risk taking? We focus on three regulatory tools: capital requirements, the restriction of activities, and official supervisory powers. Employing 10 years of unbalanced panel data on 123 Islamic and conventional banks operating in the Middle East and Asia, we arrive at the following conclusions. First, banking market power strengthens the negative impact of capital regulation on bank risk taking. Second, our empirical results suggest that the negative effect of activity restrictions on stability is diminished when banks have greater market power. Finally, we do not find strong evidence that the negative effect of supervisory power on banks’ risk taking is conditioned by their competitive behavior. In further analysis, we differentiate between Islamic and conventional banks regarding their competition, as well as their risk behavior. The results differ according to the banking business model. These findings could be useful for bank regulators in light of the accomplishment of Islamic banks’ regulatory framework. Indeed, the adoption of Basel III represents a significant regulatory challenge, given that it does not take into account the specificities of Islamic banks.

Introduction

The global financial crisis (GFC) of 2007-2009 highlighted just how fragile the banking system had become. Previous regulations failed to instill financial and systemic soundness and stability (Admati, 2014). Regrettably, not much has changed in the way of vigorous banking regulation. The question herein is why does banking regulation not work? Banking regulation aims mainly to mitigate systemic risk resulting from bank failure (Deli and Hasan, 2016) and, hence, protect depositors’ interests and maintain the financial health of the overall economy. Indeed, although regulators periodically set different levels of regulatory capital adequacy, the massive bank failures during the GFC and ensuing sovereign debt crisis revived the debate about regulatory norm effectiveness. An adequate bank regulation framework requires great appreciation of the bank behavior in the face of risk. It is a widespread view that such a framework involves a trade-off between capital regulation and bank risk taking. In this context, Altunbas et al. (2007) and Lee and Hsieh (2013) argued that this relation should be explored through two opposing hypotheses, namely, the moral hazard hypothesis and the regulatory hypothesis.