فرار مالیاتی در بازار مسکن
ترجمه نشده

فرار مالیاتی در بازار مسکن

عنوان فارسی مقاله: فرار مالیاتی – معامله ای در بازار مسکن
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله: Transaction-tax evasion in the housing market
مجله/کنفرانس: علوم منطقه ای و اقتصاد شهری – Regional Science and Urban Economics
رشته های تحصیلی مرتبط: حسابداری، اقتصاد
گرایش های تحصیلی مرتبط: حسابداری مالیاتی، اقتصاد مالی
کلمات کلیدی فارسی: مالیات انتقالی، فرار مالیاتی، بازار مسکن، رهن، تعیین قیمت، وام به ارزش، روحیه مالیاتی
کلمات کلیدی انگلیسی: transfer tax, tax evasion, housing market, mortgage, appraisal, Loan-To-Value, tax-morale
نوع نگارش مقاله: مقاله پژوهشی (Research Article)
شناسه دیجیتال (DOI): https://doi.org/10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2020.103526
دانشگاه: Universitat Pompeu Fabra – ICREA-A, Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27, 08005 Barcelona, Spain
صفحات مقاله انگلیسی: 50
ناشر: الزویر - Elsevier
نوع ارائه مقاله: ژورنال
نوع مقاله: ISI
سال انتشار مقاله: 2020
ایمپکت فاکتور: 2.397 در سال 2019
شاخص H_index: 66 در سال 2020
شاخص SJR: 1.570 در سال 2019
شناسه ISSN: 0166-0462
شاخص Quartile (چارک): Q1 در سال 2019
فرمت مقاله انگلیسی: PDF
وضعیت ترجمه: ترجمه نشده است
قیمت مقاله انگلیسی: رایگان
آیا این مقاله بیس است: خیر
آیا این مقاله مدل مفهومی دارد: ندارد
آیا این مقاله پرسشنامه دارد: ندارد
آیا این مقاله متغیر دارد: ندارد
کد محصول: E14534
رفرنس: دارای رفرنس در داخل متن و انتهای مقاله
فهرست مطالب (انگلیسی)

Abstract

JEL classification

۱٫ Introduction

۲٫ Model

۳٫ Empirical analysis

۴٫ Final remarks

Acknowledgements

Appendix A. Proofs

Appendix B. Complementary tables

Tax morale

CRediT

References

بخشی از مقاله (انگلیسی)

Abstract

We model the behaviour of a mortgagor considering to evade the real estate transfer tax. We build an observable measure of over-appraisal that is inversely related to tax evasion and conclude that the tax authority could focus auditing efforts on low-appraisal transactions. Our empirical analysis confirms the predictions using a unique database for Spain, where we directly observe: real payment, value declared to the authority and appraisal. We also argue that individual characteristics (e.g. education of the buyer) and local characteristics (e.g. local levels of corruption and trust) explain part of the observed heterogeneity in evasion. The theoretical model is augmented with guilt and stigma to be consistent with the observed heterogeneity.

Introduction

Transfer taxes (i.e. taxes on real property transactions) are common in most OECD countries and yet they remain understudied (Best and Kleven 2018). More generally, the empirical literature on tax evasion has been facing the challenge of obtaining reliable data.1 Difficulty understanding and observing fraud has obvious consequences on the effectiveness of audits performed by tax authorities. Our paper aims to help fill these gaps by focusing on home buyers’ strategic behaviour, whereby we test our prediction and provide some policy recommendations. To this end, we present a model where a mortgagor decides their housing expenditure, together with the share of the latter they declare to the tax authority. By under-declaring to the tax authority, buyers can reduce their expected tax burden. However, when they are short on assets, they may also have an interest in inflating the declared appraisal of the house, in order to facilitate obtaining a mortgage. The model exploits the tension between obtaining a larger mortgage and paying fewer taxes and it uncovers the relationship between tax evasion, access to cash (or other untraceable payment systems) and housing declared over-appraisal (that is, the ratio between declared appraisal and declared transaction).2 In particular, when agents are liquidity-constrained, potential mortgagors and financial institutions have an incentive to collude and inflate the appraisal that is declared. Typically, those same potential mortgagors are unlikely to fraud.3 Our result has an interesting policy implication: declared over-appraisal is observable, hence the tax authority could use it as a screening device to determine which transactions to audit.