دانلود مقاله دیکتاتورهای پیر و رشد اقتصادی
نکات برجسته
چیکده
کلید واژه ها
طبقه بندی JEL
1. مقدمه
2. مدل و فرضیه ها
3. داده ها
4. استراتژی برآورد
5. نتایج برآورد
6. سخنان پایانی
پیوست ریاضی. حل مدل و استاتیک مقایسه ای
منابع
Highlights
Abstract
Keywords
JEL classification
1. Introduction
2. Model and hypotheses
3. Data
4. Estimation strategy
5. Estimation results
6. Concluding remarks
Declaration of competing interest
Math Appendix. Model solution and comparative statics
References
چکیده
چرا برخی از حکومت های استبدادی نرخ رشد اقتصادی بالاتری نسبت به سایرین دارند؟ ادبیات نوظهور نشان می دهد که علاوه بر متغیرهای اقتصادی و نهادی، ویژگی های شخصی رهبران سیاسی بر نرخ رشد اقتصادی تأثیر می گذارد. در این سنت، ما یک مدل رشد سیاسی-اقتصادی از رابطه بین عصر یک دیکتاتور و رشد اقتصادی ایجاد می کنیم. این مدل پیش بینی می کند که اگر خطر مرگ و میر یک دیکتاتور افزایش یابد، نرخ رشد اقتصادی در کشور او کاهش می یابد. پیش‌بینی‌های مدل با شواهد تجربی مبتنی بر نمونه بزرگی از بیش از 400 دیکتاتور از 76 کشور پشتیبانی می‌شوند. افزایش یک ساله در سن دیکتاتور، رشد اقتصادی را 0.12 درصد کاهش می دهد. با استفاده از انتقال تصادفی رهبری به دلیل مرگ‌های طبیعی یا بیماری‌های لاعلاج، نشان می‌دهیم که این اثر با انتخاب نمونه درون‌زا هدایت نمی‌شود. همانطور که انتظار می رفت، این اثر در رژیم های سیاسی دموکراتیک وجود ندارد.
Abstract
Why do some autocracies have higher economic growth rates than others? An emerging literature is highlighting that in addition to economic and institutional variables, personal characteristics of political leaders affect economic growth rates. Within this tradition, we develop a political-economic growth model of the relationship between the age of a dictator and economic growth. The model predicts that if a dictator's mortality risk increases, the economic growth rate in his country decreases. The model predictions are supported by empirical evidence based on a large sample of more than 400 dictators from 76 countries. A 1-year increase in dictator age, decreases economic growth by 0.12 percentage points. Using random leadership transitions due to natural deaths or terminal illnesses we establish that this effect is not driven by endogenous sample selection. As expected, the effect is absent in democratic political regimes.
Introduction
Why do some autocracies have higher economic growth rates than others? This question has been intensively studied throughout the years (see e.g., Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003), Besley and Kudamatsu (2008) and Gandhi (2008)). A relatively new strand of the literature argues that not only economic and institutional variables affect economic growth rates, but that also that personal characteristics of the political leader are drivers of economic growth. In fact, Jones and Olken (2005) argue, that especially in autocratic regimes, where checks and balances are mostly weak, political leaders are responsible for (changes in) the economic growth rate. According to Besley et al. (2011), this can be attributed to differences in education levels of political leaders. Furthermore, Dreher et al. (2009) find evidence that it also relates to the attitudes of political leaders towards economic reform (see also Li et al., 2020). A completely different view is provided by Easterly and Pennings (2018), who argue that political leader effects are mostly surprises that are hard (if not impossible) to relate to personal traits of the leader.
Concluding remarks
As dictators grow older, their time horizon decreases. We show in a political-economic growth model that a decrease in the time horizon of a dictator leads to less investments in productive capital and, therefore, less output. This effect is supported by empirical estimates using a sample including over 400 dictators for the period between 1950 and 2019 . Our evidence supports the view that dictators discount the future when it comes to growth promoting policies.