چکیده
مقدمه
توسعه فرضیه
داده ها و متغیرهای اصلی
نتایج تجربی
نتیجه گیری
منابع
Abstract
Introduction
Hypothesis development
Data and main variables
Empirical results
Conclusion
References
چکیده
ما بررسی می کنیم که چگونه رقابت در بازار محصول بر تصمیمات افشای داوطلبانه شرکت، به ویژه در مورد اطلاعات زنجیره تامین تأثیر می گذارد. نتایج ما، بر اساس نمونهای از شرکتهای تولیدی فهرستشده در چین از سال 2010 تا 2016، نشان میدهد که شرکتهایی که در صنایع رقابتیتر هستند، اطلاعات مشتری/تامینکننده کمتری را افشا میکنند. نتایج اصلی از طریق چندین تست استحکام است. تحلیلهای بیشتر نشان میدهد که رابطه منفی بین رقابتپذیری بازار محصول و افشای اطلاعات زنجیره تامین زمانی قویتر است که افشا حاوی اطلاعات افزایشی بیشتری باشد و زمانی که رقبا با استفاده از اطلاعات افشا شده قادر به کسب مزیت رقابتی هستند. مطالعه ما به درک رابطه بین رقابت بازار محصول و تصمیمات افشای داوطلبانه و تنظیم افشای اطلاعات برای ایجاد بازار سرمایه شفاف کمک می کند.
توجه! این متن ترجمه ماشینی بوده و توسط مترجمین ای ترجمه، ترجمه نشده است.
Abstract
We investigate how product market competition affects corporate voluntary disclosure decisions, specifically regarding supply-chain information. Our results, based on a sample of manufacturing companies listed in China from 2010 to 2016, show that companies in more competitive industries disclose less customer/supplier information. The main results stand through several robustness tests. Further analyses show that the negative relationship between product market competitiveness and supply-chain information disclosure is stronger when the disclosure contains more incremental information and when competitors are more capable of gaining competitive advantage using the disclosed information. Our study contributes to the understanding of both the relationship between product market competition and voluntary disclosure decisions and the regulation of information disclosure to build a transparent capital market.
Introduction
After decades of rapid growth, the capital market in China now plays an increasingly prominent role in China’s social and economic development. President Xi Jinping emphasized the goal of building a healthy capital market in the report of the 19th Communist Party of China (CPC) National Congress. The chairman of the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), Yi Huiman, also pointed out that the foremost duty of the CSRC is to build a “regulated and transparent” capital market to better promote China’s high-quality economic development. The disclosure of financial information is an essential ingredient of a well-functioning capital market, (Darrough, 1993, Liu et al., 2013). In recent years, competition between companies has gradually evolved into competition between firms’ supply chains (Tang, 2009), and as a result, suppliers and customers have become crucial strategic resources able to significantly influence firms’ growth (Fisher, 1997, Christopher and Ryals, 1999). Accordingly, a listed company’s customer and supplier information provides valuable information for external investors to assess its firm value.
Conclusion
The importance of supply-chain information to corporations and to the capital market information environment is well recognized by both practitioners and academic scholars, yet empirical study of the determinants of corporate supply-chain information disclosure decisions is very limited. This study aims to fill the gap by investigating the impact of product market competition, an important external environmental factor, on the level of supply-chain information disclosure by listed companies. Our results show that intense market competition significantly reduces the level of supply-chain information disclosure. These findings are robust to a battery of robustness tests, including a DID regression using large reductions in China import tariff rates as exogenous shocks to the level of competition and change model analysis. We also provide evidence that the proprietary cost channels drive the negative relation between product market competition and supply-chain information disclosure.
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