چکیده
مقدمه
چارچوب های اروپایی و آفریقایی: اصول و موارد قابل توجه
ارزیابی چارچوب ها با استفاده از شاخص های فقهی
نتیجه گیری
Abstract
Introduction
The European and African frameworks: notable principles and cases
Assessing the frameworks through an application of the jurisprudential indicators
Conclusion
Notes
چکیده
محیط زیست سالم پیش شرط مهمی برای برخورداری از حقوق بشر است. هنگامی که به این شکل طراحی شود، حفاظت از محیط زیست به جای اینکه یک هدف باشد، در خدمت منافع انسان است. به رسمیت شناختن این رابطه در کنوانسیون اروپایی حقوق بشر و منشور آفریقایی حقوق بشر و مردم و رویه قضایی نهادهای قضایی مرتبط با آنها مشهود است. با این حال، ما میپرسیم که آیا چارچوبهای حقوق بشر اروپایی یا آفریقایی میتوانند مزایای قابلتوجهی برای حفاظت از محیط زیست ارائه دهند. از طریق بررسی دو مورد (Dubetska علیه اوکراین و SERAC در برابر نیجریه)، ما استدلال میکنیم که هر دو چارچوب به اندازهای که به دنبال تضمین شرایط زندگی بهینه برای انسان هستند، برای محیط زیست مفید هستند. با این حال، رژیمها برای ارتقای رفاه انسان، نه محیطزیست، طراحی شدهاند و در نتیجه عمدتاً برای رسیدگی به چالشهای زیستمحیطی گستردهتر مانند تغییرات آب و هوا، آلودگی یا از دست دادن تنوع زیستی به گونهای که منجر به حفاظت پایدار از محیطزیست شود، علیرغم این موارد، مجهز نیستند. مشکلات زیست محیطی پیچیده همچنان حقوق بشر را تهدید می کند. بر این اساس، تحلیل ما نیاز به مکانیسمهای قانونی مناسب دیگری را برای افراد و جوامع برای دفاع از حقوق زیستمحیطی خود و دستیابی به راه حل مناسب زمانی که حقوق بشر آنها تحت تأثیر تخریب محیطزیست قرار میگیرد، برجسته میکند.
توجه! این متن ترجمه ماشینی بوده و توسط مترجمین ای ترجمه، ترجمه نشده است.
Abstract
A healthy environment is an important precondition for the enjoyment of human rights. When framed in this way, environmental protection serves human interests rather than being an end in itself. Recognition of this relationship is evident in the European Convention on Human Rights and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and the jurisprudence of their associated judicial bodies. However, we question whether the European or African human rights frameworks might be capable of delivering a demonstrable benefit for environmental protection. Through an examination of two cases (Dubetska v Ukraine and SERAC v Nigeria), we argue that both frameworks benefit the environment to the extent they seek to secure optimal living conditions for humans. However, the regimes are designed for the promotion of human, not environmental, well-being and consequently are largely ill-equipped to address broader environmental challenges like climate change, pollution or biodiversity loss in a way that leads to lasting environmental protection, despite these complex environmental problems continuing to threaten human rights. Accordingly, our analysis highlights the need for other appropriate legal mechanisms for individuals and communities to advocate for their environmental rights and obtain a suitable remedy when their human rights are impacted by environmental degradation.
Introduction
In his separate opinion in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case, International Court of Justice Vice-President Christopher Weeramantry stated that: ‘the protection of the environment is … a vital part of contemporary human rights doctrine, for it is sine qua non for numerous human rights such as the right to health and the right to life itself’. 1 This statement captures an important legal frame through which environmental issues may be viewed, by encapsulating the notion that a healthy environment serves as a necessary pre-condition for the advancement of several recognised human rights.2 Over time, this understanding has influenced the adoption and gradual widening of a range of domestic and regional laws which recognise that environmental factors can amount, or at least contribute, to a violation of human rights, in a process sometimes described as ‘greening human rights’. 3 Other scholars have conceptualised this relationship through the notion of an ‘environmental minimum’, which views environmental protection as a necessary condition for the meaningful enjoyment of human rights and seeks to operationalise this relationship by providing individuals with (among other things) a ‘human rights claim against States to ensure basic regulations of environmental issues’. 4
Conclusion
At the beginning of this article, we described a popular legal frame through which environmental issues are increasingly being viewed, being that environmental protection is a necessary pre-condition to the ultimate goal of enjoying our human rights. Certainly this statement holds true, but what our analysis highlights is that we need to be mindful of the limits of this legal frame in trying to achieve environmental protection. The frame is premised on the assumption that humans are the ultimate beneficiaries of environmental protection and by extension, the ultimate aim of environmental protection is protecting the rights and interests of humans, rather than the intrinsic value of the environment itself.199 This proposition is certainly pervasive in human rights law, including the ECHR and the ACHPR, a fact which is unsurprising given the intrinsic anthropocentrism of human rights. However, both legal regimes have engaged to some extent with environmental human rights cases, so it is reasonable to examine the extent to which they are capable of delivering more ecocentric outcomes. As our analysis has shown, however, the European and African human rights frameworks, are largely ill-equipped to coherently and consistently deliver a demonstrable benefit for the protection of the environment more broadly.