دانلود مقاله تنظیم کیفیت و کمیت کارآفرینی
خلاصه
1. معرفی
2. چارچوب نظری
3. داده ها و روش
4. استراتژی تجربی
5. نتایج
6. بحث و نتیجه گیری
بیانیه مشارکت نویسنده CRediT
اعلامیه منافع رقابتی
در دسترس بودن داده ها
منابع
Abstract
1. Introduction
2. Theoretical framework
3. Data and methodology
4. Empirical strategy
5. Results
6. Discussion and conclusion
CRediT authorship contribution statement
Declaration of competing interest
Data availability
References
چکیده
چگونه مقررات بر نتایج کارآفرینی تأثیر می گذارد؟ ما تأثیر دو مکانیسم سیاست نظارتی - هزینه‌ها و رویه‌ها - بر کیفیت و کمیت کارآفرینی را بررسی می‌کنیم. بر اساس دیدگاه سیستم های ملی کارآفرینی، ما از نظریه های منافع عمومی و انتخاب عمومی برای این فرضیه استفاده می کنیم که چگونه هزینه های نظارتی و رویه های نظارتی می توانند بر کیفیت و کمیت کارآفرینی متفاوت تأثیر بگذارند. با استفاده از یک رویکرد چند سطحی، جهت، اندازه و شکل این تأثیرات را با داده‌های مربوط به 51330 کارآفرین نوآوری محور (بازتاب کیفیت) و 871241 کارآفرینی که سرمایه‌گذاری‌های جدید (بازتاب کمیت) را در 76 کشور طی سال‌های 2008-2017 آغاز کردند، آزمایش می‌کنیم. ما متوجه شدیم که رویه‌های نظارتی در یک کشور اغلب یک رابطه U شکل معکوس با کیفیت کارآفرینی دارند، که نشان می‌دهد وقتی سیاست‌گذاران نوآوری را هدف قرار می‌دهند، هم تعداد کم و هم تعداد زیاد رویه‌ها ممکن است مضر باشد. ما متوجه شدیم که هزینه های نظارتی تمایل دارند اثرات منفی یا معکوس U شکل بر کیفیت و کمیت کارآفرینی داشته باشند. یافته‌های ما نشان می‌دهد که نحوه اجرای مقررات - با تحمیل هزینه‌های مالی یا الزامات اداری - یک شرط مرزی برای کارآفرینی است که بر کمیت کلی کارآفرینی و کیفیت نوآوری محور کارآفرینی تأثیر می‌گذارد.
Abstract
How does regulation affect entrepreneurship outcomes? We examine the effect of two regulatory policy mechanisms—costs and procedures—on entrepreneurship quality and quantity. Based on the national systems of entrepreneurship perspective, we apply public interest and public choice theories to hypothesize how regulatory costs and regulatory procedures can affect entrepreneurship quality and quantity differently. Using a multi-level approach, we test the direction, size, and shape of these effects with data on 51,330 innovation-oriented entrepreneurs (reflecting quality) and 871,241 entrepreneurs who started new ventures (reflecting quantity) across 76 countries during 2008–2017. We find that regulatory procedures in a country often have an inverted U-shaped relationship with entrepreneurship quality, suggesting that both too few and too many procedures might be detrimental when policymakers target innovation. We find that regulatory costs tend to have negative or inverted U-shaped effects on entrepreneurship quality and quantity. Our findings show that the way regulations are administered—by imposing financial costs or administrative requirements—is a boundary condition for entrepreneurship that affects the overall quantity of entrepreneurship and the innovation-centered quality of entrepreneurship.
Introduction
There is growing interest in how policies may better target specific goals (World Bank, 2023) and which levers can be adjusted to induce a particular entrepreneurship effect. Scholars and policymakers increasingly see regulation as a tool to influence entrepreneurship, and in some cases to target activities such as innovation, firm growth, and exporting. How the regulatory environment affects entrepreneurs is a complicated question. For example, should regulators simplify regulations or reduce filing fees for mandatory forms if their goal is to encourage more entrepreneurship in general? What if the goal is to achieve more innovation? Some policies favor prioritizing the “quality” of entrepreneurship, such as job creation, new products development, opportunity exploration, and innovation, versus generally a higher volume of entrepreneurship. Other perspectives consider whether the role of public policy is to focus on knowledge dissemination and creation via entrepreneurship. For example, will innovation be undersupplied without public support (see Mazzucato and Perez, 2015)?
The economic effects of differences in regulation on entrepreneurship are often not well understood (Audretsch et al., 2019; Fritsch et al., 2021). Entrepreneurship and institutions research examines which regulatory domains matter, such as tax policy, property registration, entry regulation, bankruptcy laws, and export permitting (e.g., Autio et al., 2014; Busenitz et al., 2000; Estrin et al., 2016, Estrin et al., 2019; Klapper et al., 2006), but how the effects are induced needs more attention (Audretsch et al., 2022). Findings on the direction and size of key relationships can be inconclusive (Stenholm et al., 2013; Estrin et al., 2013a), with some recent studies point to non-linear relationships (Braunerhjelm et al., 2021; Braunerhjelm, 2022; Audretsch et al., 2019). This could stem from the heterogeneity of both regulation and entrepreneurship; regulation varies widely in type and nature of change, and entrepreneurship can take many forms (see Klapper and Love, 2016; Braunerhjelm et al., 2015, Braunerhjelm et al., 2021; Chowdhury et al., 2019; Colombelli et al., 2016). Prior work often examined the rate of entrepreneurship activity, such as events, entry, and flows (e.g., Parker, 2009; Reynolds et al., 2002), and the research lacks consensus about determinants, including regulation, of entrepreneurship quality and quantity (see Cole et al., 2016; Colombelli et al., 2016; Sobel, 2008).
Results
We use a six-step approach to test our hypotheses. First, we test the significance of the country-year group variance for the dependent variable by excluding individual and country-year level independent variables and controls (i.e., the null random model) (specification 1, Table 4, Table 5) to justify the use of multilevel models (Rabe-Hesketh et al., 2005). Second, we add individual predictors and year and industry controls to test the effects of entrepreneurs' internal resources and capabilities on change in the likelihood of engaging in innovation and new entry. Third, in addition to our individual variables, we include country-year explanatory variables in levels (specification 3, Table 4, Table 5). Fourth, we add country-year explanatory variables for regulatory costs and procedures in levels, together with the quadratic term, to establish our baseline specification and to test H1 and H2 (specification 4, Table 4, Table 5). Fifth, we add country-level control variables that predict how other socioeconomic conditions may affect entrepreneurship quality and quantity in a country (specification 5, Table 4, Table 5). Finally, we use individual-level controls, along with one-year lagged linear and quadratic terms of regulatory cost and procedures and other country-level variables (one year lagged), to test the role of regulation in shaping entrepreneurship.