فرار از پرداخت مالیات شرکت
ترجمه نشده

فرار از پرداخت مالیات شرکت

عنوان فارسی مقاله: رقابت و فرار از پرداخت مالیات شرکت: یک دیدگاه مبتنی بر موسسه
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله: Competition and corporate tax evasion: An institution-based view
مجله/کنفرانس: مجله کسب و کار جهانی – Journal of World Business
رشته های تحصیلی مرتبط: حسابداری، مدیریت
گرایش های تحصیلی مرتبط: حسابداری مالیاتی، مدیریت کسب و کار MBA
کلمات کلیدی فارسی: اقتصاد غیررسمی، رقابت، موسسات، فرار از پرداخت مالیات شرکت
کلمات کلیدی انگلیسی: Informal economy, Competition, Institutions, Corporate tax evasion
نوع نگارش مقاله: مقاله پژوهشی (Research Article)
نمایه: Scopus – Master journals – JCR
شناسه دیجیتال (DOI): https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jwb.2016.12.006
دانشگاه: University of Texas at Dallas, Jindal School of Management, United States
ناشر: الزویر - Elsevier
نوع ارائه مقاله: ژورنال
نوع مقاله: ISI
سال انتشار مقاله: 2017
ایمپکت فاکتور: 3.993 در سال 2017
شاخص H_index: 87 در سال 2019
شاخص SJR: 1.722 در سال 2019
شناسه ISSN: 1090-9516
شاخص Quartile (چارک): Q1 در سال 2019
فرمت مقاله انگلیسی: PDF
تعداد صفحات مقاله انگلیسی: 12
وضعیت ترجمه: ترجمه نشده است
قیمت مقاله انگلیسی: رایگان
آیا این مقاله بیس است: بله
کد محصول: E3920
فهرست انگلیسی مطالب

Abstract


1- Introduction


2- Theory and hypotheses


3- Methodology


4- Results


5- Discussion


6- Conclusion


References

نمونه متن انگلیسی مقاله

Abstract


Why do firms evade taxes? We tackle this question by studying firms in the formal sector operating in countries with different institutional backgrounds, and comparing the incentives and constraints of staying within the formal sector against the competitive pressures originating from the informal sector. We argue that it is the combination of these factors that largely explains formal firms’ tax evasion decisions. Our findings highlight the dark side of competition, particularly when it originates from perceivably unfair sources (i.e. from the informal sector). We also shed light on how this effect is moderated by the institutional conditions of the environment.


Introduction


In international business, the institution-based view asserts that firm behaviors around the world are affected by the rules of the game—specifically institutions that govern the “do’s” and the “don’ts” (Dunning & Lundan, 2008; North, 1990; Peng, Ahlstrom, Carraher, & Shi, in press; Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 2008). However, not all firms comply with all the rules and regulations. Instead, corporate misconduct is frequent around the world. One of the most ubiquitous illegal corporate behaviors in almost every country is corporate tax evasion, which is defined as a managerial decision not to fully report taxable corporate profit in order to reduce tax payments (Sandmo, 2005).1 Past research has identified several factors that influence the likelihood of corporate tax evasion (Andreoni, Erard, & Feinstein, 1998), such as public sector corruption (Friedman, Johnson, Kaufmann, & Zoido-Lobaton, 2000; Goerke, 2008), tax rates (Cowell, 2004; Fisman & Wei, 2004), degree of penalties (Gordon, 1990), fairness of the tax code (Cullis and Lewis, 1997), and effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms (Desai & Dharmapala, 2006; Desai, Dyck, & Zingales, 2007). However, the interplay between formal and informal firms is underexplored in the literature (Mathias, Lux, Crook, Autry, & Zaretzki, 2015). Due to significant variations in the prevalence of the informal economy across countries, international business (IB) research would benefit from a better understanding of the dynamics of competition between these two groups of firms, and the resulting effects on formal firms’ tax compliance decisions.

  • اشتراک گذاری در

دیدگاه خود را بنویسید:

تاکنون دیدگاهی برای این نوشته ارسال نشده است

فرار از پرداخت مالیات شرکت
نوشته های مرتبط
مقالات جدید
لوگوی رسانه های برخط

logo-samandehi

پیوندها