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عنوان فارسی مقاله: آیا مدیریت سود به نرخ تخفیف حساس است؟
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله: Is earnings management sensitive to discount rates?
مجله/کنفرانس: مجله ادبیات حسابداری – Journal of Accounting Literature
رشته های تحصیلی مرتبط: مدیریت، اقتصاد، حسابداری
گرایش های تحصیلی مرتبط: مدیریت مالی، اقتصاد مالی، حسابداری مالی
کلمات کلیدی فارسی: مدیریت سود، جریمه نقدی، دستکاری عملیات واقعی، نرخ تخفیف
کلمات کلیدی انگلیسی: Earnings management, Accruals, Real activities manipulation, Discount rates
نوع نگارش مقاله: مقاله پژوهشی (Research Article)
نمایه: Scopus - Master Journal List
شناسه دیجیتال (DOI): https://doi.org/10.1016/j.acclit.2018.03.001
دانشگاه: Hanken School of Economics – Vasa – Finland
ناشر: الزویر - Elsevier
نوع ارائه مقاله: ژورنال
نوع مقاله: ISI
سال انتشار مقاله: 2018
ایمپکت فاکتور: 3.250 در سال 2017
شاخص H_index: 6 در سال 2019
شاخص SJR: 0.986 در سال 2017
شناسه ISSN: 0737-4607
شاخص Quartile (چارک): Q1 در سال 2017
فرمت مقاله انگلیسی: PDF
تعداد صفحات مقاله انگلیسی: 14
وضعیت ترجمه: ترجمه نشده است
قیمت مقاله انگلیسی: رایگان
آیا این مقاله بیس است: بله
کد محصول: E6725
فهرست انگلیسی مطالب

Abstract


1- Introduction


2- Background


3- A simple simulation


4- Data and empirical methodology


5- Model estimation


6- Robustness and sensitivity analysis


7- Discussion and limitations


8- Conclusion


Appendix A. Variable definitions


References

نمونه متن انگلیسی مقاله

Abstract


We argue that managers’ choice to manage earnings depends on the trade-off in the present value of expected future net benefits associated with that choice. Specifically, we examine if discount rates are associated with the likelihood that managers engage in earnings management to meet or beat various earnings targets. We find that discount rates are positively associated with incomeincreasing earnings management. This means that managers increase both accrual-based and real earnings management when discount rates are higher. However, the economic magnitude of this association is relatively moderate.


Introduction


This paper examines whether managers’ decisions to engage in income-increasing earnings management are sensitive to discount rates. Rational managers are expected to pursue and favor strategies that maximize their own gains, even at the expense of other stakeholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Financial reporting provides one way to serve self-interests, particularly when information asymmetry exists between users and providers of the reports. Managers can take accounting or real economic actions to manage short-term performance and, consequently, serve self-interests e.g. by triggering earnings-based performance compensation (Gaver, Gaver, & Austin, 1995; Healy, 1985; Holthausen, Larcker, & Sloan, 1995; Watts & Zimmerman, 1986) to meet capital market expectations (Eames, 1998) or prior to IPOs (Teoh, Welch, & Wong, 1998). There is considerable empirical evidence showing that managerial self-interests affect their decision horizon. For example, CEOs respond to personal earnings-based incentives by engaging in short-term performance-enhancing activities, rather than long-term value creation that would benefit shareholders (Bergstresser & Philippon, 2006; Dechow & Sloan, 1991). Similarly, shorter expected CEO tenure has been associated with higher agency costs, lower earnings quality, and greater probability of information-based trading, providing evidence that shorter decision horizons motivate managers to invest in projects with quicker payback (Antia, Pantzalis, & Park, 2010; Gopalan, Milbourn, Song, & Thakor, 2014).

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