دانلود مقاله مالکیت شرکت، نوع دوستی کارمندان و رقابت در بازار محصول
چکیده
مقدمه
مدل
تصمیم گیری استخدام شرکت ها و نتیجه متعادل
خصوصی سازی، ملی شدن یا انحصار دو جانبه فروش؟
نتیجه گیری
منابع
Abstract
Introduction
The model
Firms’ hiring decision and equilibrium outcome
Privatization, nationalization, or mixed duopoly?
Conclusions
References
چکیده
این مقاله شرکت‌های حداکثر سود (یا خصوصی) و شرکت‌های اجتماعی (یا دولتی) را که با یکدیگر در قیمت و کیفیت رقابت می‌کنند، در نظر می‌گیرد. در این تنظیم، ما مطالعه می‌کنیم که چگونه رقابت در بازار محصول بر تصمیم شرکت‌ها برای استخدام کارمندان نوع‌دوست یا خودخواه تأثیر می‌گذارد. ما نشان می‌دهیم که شرکت‌های دولتی همیشه کارمندان نوع‌دوست را استخدام می‌کنند، در حالی که شرکت‌های خصوصی کارکنان خودخواه را تنها در صورتی استخدام می‌کنند که (i) محصولات به اندازه کافی متمایز باشند و (۲) آنها با شرکت‌های دولتی رقابت کنند. در نهایت، ما تعیین می کنیم که کدام پیکربندی بازار با بالاترین کیفیت و مطلوبیت کلی مشتریان مرتبط است. ما متوجه شدیم که وقتی رقابت در بازار محصول سخت‌تر است، دوپولی مختلط ترجیح داده می‌شود.
توجه! این متن ترجمه ماشینی بوده و توسط مترجمین ای ترجمه، ترجمه نشده است.
Abstract
The paper considers profit-maximizing (or private) firms and socially-concerned (or public) firms that compete against each other on both prices and quality. In this setting, we study how product market competition affects firms' decision to hire altruistic or selfish employees. We show that public firms will always hire altruistic employees, whereas private firms will hire selfish employees only if (i) products are sufficiently differentiated and (ii) they compete against public firms. Lastly, we determine which market configuration is associated with the highest quality and the overall customers’ utility. We find that mixed duopoly is more likely to be preferred when product market competition is tougher.
Introduction
Abundant experimental and empirical evidence shows that individuals display altruistic preferences (see among others Buurman et al., 2012, Konow, 2010, Tonin and Vlassopoulos, 2010, 2015, Imas, 2014, Lilley and Slonim, 2014, Ottoni-Wilhelm et al., 2014, Charness et al., 2016, and Dur and van Lent, 2018). As defined by Fehr and Schmidt (2006) “A person is altruistic if her utility increases with the well-being of other people”. Altruistic employees are not only interested in their “egoistic” payoff, but also in the customers' well-being. More specifically, they internalize in their own utility the effects that both prices and quality entail for customers’ utility. When this is the case, employees also care about the price charged by the firms they work for and the firms can extract a lower amount of surplus from their customers for any given level of quality (see Manna, 2017).
Conclusions
This paper investigates how product market competition impacts on firms' hiring decision in a mixed duopoly environment, and how their interaction impacts on market outcomes. We have shown that the firms' hiring decision crucially depends on the degree of competition in the market. More specifically, if competition in the market is fierce, as firms offer similar services, both the public and the private firm benefit from hiring altruistic employees. However, this is no longer the case when firms offer sufficiently differentiated services. In this case, only the public firm hires an altruistic employee. As altruistic employees also care about the price charged for the product or service, the firms can extract a lower amount of surplus from their customers. This is more detrimental to the private than to the public firm because the latter is also interested in the customers' well-being. As the services are sufficiently differentiated, the private firm does not find it profitable to start a price war with the public firm and prefers to hire the self-interested employee. It is important to stress that the private firm will always hire an altruistic employee if it competes with another private firm.