دانلود مقاله اثر گذاری مشغله کمیته حسابرسی بر مدیریت سود در بریتانیا
چکیده
مقدمه
کمیته های حسابرسی، مشغله اعضا و کیفیت سود
نمونه و متغیرها
تحلیل تجربی
نتیجه گیری
منابع
Abstract
Introduction
Audit committees, member busyness, and earnings quality
Sample and variables
Empirical analysis
Conclusions
Declaration of Competing Interest
References
چکیده
ما تأثیر مشغله کمیته حسابرسی بر مدیریت سود در شرکت‌های FTSE350 را بین سال‌های 2007 و 2013 بررسی می‌کنیم، دوره‌ای که شامل بحران مالی جهانی و پیامدهای فوری آن می‌شود. با استفاده از طیفی از معیارهای مشغله کاری و بررسی تأثیر بر اقلام تعهدی و مدیریت سود واقعی، متوجه می‌شویم که مشغله اعضای کمیته حسابرسی تأثیر منفی بر کیفیت سود دارد، که نشان می‌دهد اعضایی که تعداد کرسی‌های هیئت مدیره بیشتری دارند، ناظر مؤثر کمتری بر مدیران هستند. تمایل به دستکاری درآمد یافته‌های ما در FTSE250 بیشتر از FTSE100 است. همچنین دریافتیم که تأثیر مخرب کمیته‌های حسابرسی شلوغ در طول بحران مالی بارزتر است و در مورد مدیریت سود واقعی، پس از آن مشاهده نمی‌شود. یافته‌های ما سؤالات مهمی را برای تنظیم‌کننده‌های حاکمیت شرکتی مطرح می‌کند، که قبلاً به دنبال رسیدگی به مشغله کمیته حسابرسی و تأثیر بالقوه آن بر اثربخشی کمیته حسابرسی نبوده‌اند. نتایج ما همچنین بر نیاز محققان به درک شرایط اقتصادی گسترده‌تر که در آن مطالعات انجام می‌شود، فقدان همگنی بین شرکت‌های بزرگتر و کوچک‌تر فهرست‌شده و اهمیت صلاحیت قضایی در مطالعات مرتبط با حاکمیت تأکید می‌کند.
توجه! این متن ترجمه ماشینی بوده و توسط مترجمین ای ترجمه، ترجمه نشده است.
Abstract
We investigate the impact of audit committee busyness on earnings management in FTSE350 companies between 2007 and 2013, a period that includes the global financial crisis and its immediate aftermath. Using a range of busyness measures and examining the impact on both accruals and real earnings management, we find that the busyness of audit committee members has a negative impact on earnings quality, which suggests that members with more board seats are less effective monitors of managers’ desire to manipulate earnings. Our findings are more pronounced in FTSE250 than in FTSE100 firms. We also find that the detrimental impact of busy audit committees is more pronounced during the financial crisis and, in the case of real earnings management, is not observed afterwards. Our findings raise important questions for corporate governance regulators, who have not previously sought to address audit committee busyness and its potential impact on audit committee effectiveness. Our results also emphasize the need for researchers to appreciate the wider economic circumstances in which studies are undertaken, the lack of homogeneity between larger and smaller listed firms, and the importance of jurisdiction in governance-related studies.
Introduction
The emergence of audit committees as a key component of the corporate governance architecture, allied with specific recommendations regarding their structure and composition, has encouraged academic research to better understand their governance role. Over the past two decades, researchers have provided significant empirical evidence on the use and usefulness of audit committees (Ali and Zhang, 2015, Dhaliwal et al., 2010, Ghafran and O’Sullivan, 2017, Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2008, Tanyi and Smith, 2015). Much of this work has focused on the value and relevance of audit committees’ characteristics stipulated by regulation, specifically size, independence, meeting frequency, and expertise. Researchers typically seek to ascertain whether these characteristics influence specific aspects of corporate behavior and thereby enhance or reduce audit committee effectiveness (Bilal, 2018, Ghafran and O’Sullivan, 2017, Samaha et al., 2015).
Conclusions
Over the past two decades, major irregularities have raised concerns about the reliability and credibility of financial disclosures. These developments have encouraged regulators to seek ways of improving the integrity and quality of the financial reporting process. In response, audit committees have become a central element in attempts at reforming corporate governance in general and the quality of financial reporting in particular. One aspect of audit committees that has escaped much regulatory attention is the busyness of their members, specifically the extent to which they hold directorships in other companies and the potential for this to impact their effectiveness. This is important since busy audit committee members may be unable to adequately monitor the quality of financial disclosures made by their executive colleagues. This study examines this issue in the context of UK-listed companies. We investigate whether the holding of other board positions by audit committee members impacts the extent of earnings management using both AEM and REM. We further investigate whether the sensitivity of audit committee member busyness and the extent of earnings management changed in response the financial crisis and whether our results are different for FTSE100 versus FTSE250 firms.
H1: The busyness of audit committee members has no impact on earnings quality
H2: There is no difference in the sensitivity of the busyness of audit committee members and earnings management during and after the financial crisis
H3: There is less sensitivity between audit committee busyness and earnings management in FTSE100 companies than in FTSE250 companies
Earnings Management (AEM)
Earnings Management (REM)
AC Average Directorships
% AC 2plus Directorships
Average AC Positions
AC Chair Directorships
AC Size Dummy
AC Independence Dummy
AC Meetings Dummy
AC % Accounting Expertise
Log AC Tenure
% Share Ownership
Log Audit Fee
% Independent Directors
Big 4
Log Total Assets
Leverage
ROA
Loss