دانلود مقاله تاثیر بین المللی سازی بر مدیریت سود شرکت های بازارهای نوظهور
چکیده
مقدمه
چالش های مشروعیت و مدیریت سود
داده ها و نتایج
نتیجه گیری
منابع
Abstract
Introduction
Legitimacy challenges and earnings management
Data and results
Conclusions
References
چکیده
این مطالعه تأثیر بین‌المللی‌سازی را بر رفتار نادرست شرکتی مدیریت سود توسط شرکت‌های چندملیتی بازارهای نوظهور بررسی می‌کند. ما پیشنهاد می‌کنیم که بین‌المللی‌سازی این شرکت‌ها را در معرض نظارت شدید ذینفعان کشور میزبان و حوزه فرا نهادی قرار می‌دهد و EMNEها دستکاری درآمدها را کاهش می‌دهند تا از مشروعیت‌زدایی در ذهن ذینفعان کشورهای میزبان جلوگیری کنند. ما شواهد تجربی را برای پیش‌بینی‌های خود بر روی یک نمونه چند صنعت از 21477 مشاهدات سالانه شرکت متعلق به 2461 شرکت هندی طی سال‌های 2005 تا 2018 پیدا کردیم. علاوه بر این، ما متوجه شدیم که "نظارت خارجی" ناشی از بین المللی شدن نقش جایگزینی برای مکانیسم های "نظارت داخلی" حاکمیت شرکتی در مدیریت سود ایفا می کند.
توجه! این متن ترجمه ماشینی بوده و توسط مترجمین ای ترجمه، ترجمه نشده است.
Abstract
This study examines the impact of internationalization on the corporate misconduct of earnings management by emerging market multinational enterprises. We propose that internationalization exposes these firms to heightened scrutiny by meta-institutional field and host country stakeholders, and EMNEs reduce earnings manipulation to avoid de-legitimation in the minds of host-nations’ stakeholders. We find empirical evidence for our predictions on a multi-industry sample of 21,477 firm-year observations belonging to 2,461 Indian firms during 2005 – 2018. Additionally, we find that internationalization induced 'external monitoring' plays a substitutive role for the 'internal monitoring' mechanisms of corporate governance on earnings management.
Introduction
The onset of pro-market reforms in several emerging economies during the late 1980s and early 1990s triggered internationalization by incumbent firms from these economies (Popli et al., 2017). However, prevalent institutional hazards such as bureaucracy, corruption, opaque governance practices, and weak enforcement of contracts in their home countries, emerging market multinational enterprises (henceforth, EMNEs) face legitimacy deficits in the minds of their host country stakeholders (Li et al., 2020; Suchman, 1995). As a result, EMNEs experience heightened stakeholder pressures and scrutiny (Surroca et al., 2013). Legitimacy is instrumental in gaining access to diverse resources and capabilities and earn a reputation in the minds of stakeholders (Marano et al., 2017), which are quintessential to the realization of the intended objectives of internationalization. Thus, in addition to other legitimacybuilding strategies such as cross-listing, improving governance attributes, and implementing globally recognized audit and certification mechanisms (Deng & Zhang, 2018; Popli et al., 2021), EMNEs may avoid corporate misconduct that may put them at the risk of de-legitimation. Hence, we hypothesize and find support that EMNEs, under 'external monitoring' by host nation stakeholders, would signal higher transparency by reducing their involvement in earnings management.
Conclusions
EMNEs pursue several actions in the market and non-market domain to gain legitimacy in the minds of the host nation stakeholders. However, it is crucial that these firms also reduce their involvement in actions that expose them to the risk of de-legitimation. To that end, this study theorizes and find support that EMNEs' degree of internationalization negatively impacts corporate misconduct of earnings management. Our findings yield considerable evidence to show that EMNEs tend to reduce earnings management, thereby adhering to the expectations of diverse stakeholder pressures and increased stakeholder monitoring resulting from internationalization. We surmise that they do so to reduce their risk of de-legitimation and ensure stakeholder participation in their internationalization pursuits. Our results are robust to alternate measures of our key dependent and independent variables and estimation methods. Furthermore, in our post-hoc analysis, we find that 'external’ and ‘internal’ monitoring mechanisms stemming from firms' internationalization and corporate governance respectively, are substitutive mechanisms in reducing corporate misconduct of earnings manipulation.
Hypothesis 1 (H1): The degree of internationalization of emerging market multinational enterprises will be negatively related to earnings management