دانلود مقاله کاهش مدیریت سود شرکت با لحاظ کردن دولت به عنوان مشتری
چکیده
مقدمه
مروری بر مطالعات پیشین
فرضیه ها
داده ها و روش شناسی
تحلیل رگرسیون مقطعی
بخش بررسی استحکام
مدیریت سود و فروش از انواع مختلف مشتریان دولتی
نتیجه گیری
منابع
Abstract
Introduction
Literature review
Hypotheses
Data and methodology
Cross-sectional regression analyses
Robustness check section
Earnings management and sales from different types of government customers
Conclusion
References
چکیده
آیا قراردادهای دولتی به کیفیت سود بهتر و مدیریت سود کمتر منجر می شود؟ در این تحقیق به دنبال پاسخ به این سوال هستیم. ما شواهد قوی پیدا کردیم مبنی بر اینکه تامین کنندگان دولتی به طور استراتژیک مدیریت سود مبتنی بر تعهدی را با مدیریت سود واقعی جایگزین می کنند. شرکت‌هایی که مشتریان دولتی دارند به طور مشخص از دستکاری فعالیت‌های واقعی بیشتری نسبت به همتایان خود در صنعت استفاده می‌کنند، همانطور که مخارج اختیاری غیرعادی، هزینه‌های تولید غیرعادی و دستکاری کل فعالیت‌های واقعی و در عین حال اجتناب از دستکاری تعهدی است. این یافته‌ها برای یک سری از بررسی‌های استحکام از جمله خطاهای اندازه‌گیری، سوگیری انتخاب و درون‌زایی قوی هستند. از این رو، یافته‌های ما پیامدهایی برای سیاست تدارکات دارد، زیرا سیاست‌گذاران ممکن است کل فعالیت‌های مدیریت درآمد تامین‌کنندگان دولتی را دست کم بگیرند.
توجه! این متن ترجمه ماشینی بوده و توسط مترجمین ای ترجمه، ترجمه نشده است.
Abstract
Does government contracting translate to better earnings quality and less earnings management? In this study, we seek to answer this question. We find strong evidence that government suppliers strategically substitute accrual-based earnings management with real earnings management. Firms with government customers distinctively employ greater real activities manipulation than their industry peers, as proxied by abnormal discretionary expenditures, abnormal production costs, and total real activities manipulation while avoiding accrual manipulation. These findings are robust to a host of robustness checks including measurement errors, selection bias and endogeneity. Hence, our findings have implications for procurement policy as policymakers may underestimate the total earnings management activities of government suppliers.
Introduction
Government agencies are among the largest customers in the world. Consequently, procuring a contract to supply a government agency represents a tremendous financial opportunity for firms in the private sector.1 These supplier-customer relationships can significantly reduce the operational risk of government contractors by decreasing demand uncertainty (Cohen and Li, 2020). Contractors also enjoy steadier cash flows, have better access to capital markets, and pay lower equity costs than their peers (Dhaliwal et al., 2016; Huang et al., 2016; Paglia and Harjoto, 2014). Therefore, to protect contract revenues, the political cost hypothesis avers that government suppliers often take actions to deflect or preempt potential negative government actions, which can result in higher political costs (e.g. Watts and Zimmerman, 1986).
Conclusion
We examine real activities and accrual-based earnings management among U.S. firms within the context of sales to government agencies over the period from 1980 to 2017 using a large sample of firms with customer-level data in Compustat. We study various measures of earnings management and sales levels to different types of government agencies. We find robust evidence that government suppliers engage in more real earnings management than their non-government contracting industry peers. This finding is robust to alternative definitions of earnings management, and persists even after accounting for potential endogeneity and selection biases. However, there is limited and mixed evidence that government suppliers manage accruals depending on the type government agency. We find that discretionary accruals increase with sales to foreign government agencies after considering other factors, whereas they decrease with sales to federal and state government agencies (but not local government agencies). We also consider other earnings management practices and find ample evidence to suggest that government suppliers are more prone to distort earnings than other firms.
H1: Government suppliers engage in more real activities management than other firms
H2: Government suppliers engage in less accrual management than other firms
H3: Real activities management is positively related to the fraction of sales to government agency customers
H4: Accrual management is negatively related to the fraction of sales to government agency customers