دانلود مقاله رفتار مدیریت سود مدیران شرکت بر اساس نظریه بازی های تکاملی
چکیده
مقدمه
ساخت الگوی بازی مدیر و سهامدار
تحلیل بازی تکاملی
تجزیه و تحلیل شبیه سازی عددی
نتیجه گیری
منابع
Abstract
Introduction
Construction of the Game Model of the Manager and Shareholder
Evolutionary Game Analysis
Analysis of Numerical Simulation
Conclusions
References
چکیده
امروزه، سوءمدیریت سود در شرکت‌های چینی به یک مشکل جدی تبدیل شده است، زیرا مدیران از طریق مدیریت درآمد، کلاهبرداری مالی انجام می‌دهند و مانع از توسعه کلی اقتصادی چین می‌شوند. بر اساس نیاز سهامداران و نگرانی های سرمایه گذاران، مدیران باید اطلاعات مالی واقعی را افشا کنند. این مقاله تابع درآمد تولید شده توسط مدیر و سهامدار را از طریق یک مدل تئوری تکاملی تحلیل می کند که در آن تیم مدیران شرکت و سهامداران هر دو طرف بازی هستند. پس از ساخت مدل، این مقاله از پایتون برای تحریک مدل نظری برای تجزیه و تحلیل رفتار هر دو طرف برای توضیح روند نظریه بازی‌های تکاملی استفاده می‌کند.
توجه! این متن ترجمه ماشینی بوده و توسط مترجمین ای ترجمه، ترجمه نشده است.
Abstract
Today, earnings mismanagement in China’s enterprises has become a serious problem as managers conduct financial fraud by means of earnings management, hindering China’s overall economic development. Upon shareholders’ requirements and investors’ concerns, managers should disclose real financial information. The essay analyzes the revenue function generated by the manager and the shareholder through an evolutionary theory model where the managers team of the enterprise and shareholders are both game parties. After building the model, the essay utilizes Python to stimulate the theoretical model to analyze both parties’ behavior to explain the process of evolutionary game theory.
Introduction
For decades, enterprise managers misusing earnings management for personal interests have been headlines. Financial fraud has become one of the key issues discussed in relevant circles for theoretical and practical perspectives. Many enterprises create fake profits by manipulating earnings management to mislead investors who may invest more in the company once they believe its good performance. Meanwhile, there are some enterprises that modify the financial reports with a shrunk profit to avoid tax by increasing the cost expenses of the company, etc. [1–4]. Against such a context, it is necessary to study enterprise earnings management. Schipper believes that earnings management is a purposeful intervention in the external financial reporting process, with the intent of obtaining some private gain managers [5]. As Canadian scholar Scott writes in his work, earnings management is defined as the choice by enterprise managers who use selected accounting policy to smooth their compensation or maximize the enterprise market value [6]. Liang and Wang established an evolutionary game theory model of PPP projects to study the game pattern of government and private investors, based on which they give specific suggestions [7]. Based on the bounded rational person, Zhang constructed an evolutionary game model to study the sci-tech innovation behaviors of government and small and medium-sized enterprises as the parties of the game.
Conclusions
The above analysis has clearly explained the results of the evolutionary game between the two parties. Based on the purpose of studying the behavior of enterprise managers’ earnings management, the following suggestions are put forward for the interests of shareholders:
(i) Set stricter penalties for management fraud. Managers will manage earnings when the net benefits of earnings management are far greater than the risk of being punished by shareholders. The author suggests that corporations could build regulations framework to ensure managers undertake the losses incurred by supervision and then give up the strategy of earnings management. Meanwhile, the punishment to earnings management in current society is seldom convicted as criminal cases, and there are loopholes in current laws and regulations that give managers chances to commit fraud without being punished. It is obvious that managers will continue their financial fraud when the penalty amount is less than the net benefits of earnings management; thus, it seems meaningless for the punishment to managers. Therefore, the paper suggests strictly punishing the earnings management behavior that hurts shareholders’ interests. The punishment to counterfeiters is not only up to the penalty amount but also closely related to the chances of identifying the wrong earnings management. Therefore, it is particularly important to improve the mechanism of identifying the illegal benefits generated during earnings management. Enterprises should know more about the various means of counterfeiting behaviors, to obtain clues on how managers grasp income through earnings management.