دانلود مقاله بیست سال با یورو: ادغام بازار بانکداری
چکیده
مقدمه
اهمیت یکپارچگی بازار بانکداری عمیق
چارچوب نظری برای بررسی یکپارچگی بازار بانکداری عمیق
روش شناسی
داده ها و دوره های نمونه
نتایج
نتیجه گیری
منابع
Abstract
Introduction
The importance of deep banking market integration
A theoretical framework for investigating deep banking market integration
Methodology
Data and sample periods
Results
Conclusions
References
چکیده
ادغام بازار بانکی برای یک اتحادیه پولی اروپا با ثبات ضروری است، اما در طول بحران منطقه یورو به شدت مختل شد. با بازارهای بانکداری ملی ناهمگون، تفسیر همگرایی اخیر نرخ های بهره ملی پس از بحران به عنوان یکپارچگی بازسازی شده در ادبیات به چالش کشیده شده است. بنابراین، ما ادغام را تحت شرایط ناهمگونی بازار برای 12 کشور منطقه یورو قبل، در طول و بعد از بحران از سال 2003 تا 2019، با استفاده از ترکیبی جدید از تحلیل‌ها و برآوردهای شبکه‌ای پیشرفته از پیوندهای نرخ بهره دوجانبه بررسی می‌کنیم. ما ادغام را به عنوان روابط علیت دو طرفه (گرنجر) بین نرخ‌های وام یا حاشیه اندازه‌گیری می‌کنیم تا مکانیسم‌های آربیتراژ مقاوم در برابر بحران را شناسایی کنیم. گستردگی، اختلال و بازیابی آنها، تحلیل شبکه بعدی ما را نشان می دهد، که فاش می کند که بحران منطقه یورو اساساً و به طور مداوم این شبکه را فراتر از دوره بحران مختل کرده است، حتی زمانی که نرخ های بهره و حاشیه ها همگرا هستند. رویکرد ما تجزیه و تحلیل‌های یکپارچه‌سازی موجود را با آشکار ساختن فروپاشی مرتبط با سیاست، اما در غیر این صورت شناسایی نشده، تکمیل و گسترش می‌دهد.
توجه! این متن ترجمه ماشینی بوده و توسط مترجمین ای ترجمه، ترجمه نشده است.
Abstract
Banking market integration is essential for a stable European Monetary Union but was severely disrupted during the Eurozone crisis. With heterogeneous national banking markets, interpreting the recent post-crisis convergence of national interest rates as restored integration has been challenged in the literature. We therefore scrutinize integration under the condition of market heterogeneity for 12 Eurozone countries before, during and after the Eurozone crisis from 2003 to 2019, employing a novel combination of state-of-the-art network analyses and estimates of bilateral interest rate linkages. We measure integration as bi-directional (Granger) causality relations between lending rates or margins in order to identify crisis-resilient arbitrage mechanisms. Their extent, disruption and restoration inform our subsequent network analysis, which unveils that the Eurozone crisis has fundamentally and persistently disrupted this network beyond the crisis period even when interest rates and margins are converging. Our approach complements and extends existing integration analyses by revealing policy-relevant but otherwise undetected disintegration.
Introduction
In 1999, the single European currency was introduced in 11 countries which, surprisingly, paid little attention to the state of integration of their banking markets, which would henceforth carry out all financial cross-border transactions in the Eurozone in Euros. The Maastricht Treaty formulated the conditions for joining the European Monetary Union (EMU), but none of them was related to banking markets.1 More surprisingly, little was known about the state of European banking market integration at the time.2 In 1999, hopes were pinned on the creation of the single currency to boost financial integration. Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa (2000) from the board of the European Central Bank (ECB) argued at the time that the ‘multiplicity of currencies in the single market was a fundamental factor behind the preservation of the segmentation of the banking industry’ and ‘it is indeed the existence of a single currency and a single central bank which very often unifies a banking system’.
Conclusions
Twenty years after launching the experiment of a single currency without establishing a single banking market, the vulnerability of this approach has become clear to monetary and financial integration experts as well as policymakers. In this paper, we propose a novel combination of state-of-the-art network analyses and estimates of Granger-causal bilateral interest rate and margin linkages for heterogeneous banking markets. Our proposed measure is superior to correlation metrics in identifying deep integration understood as a crisis-resilient arbitrage mechanism and can distinguish deep from shallow integration. Hence, our results indicate that increasing correlations of interest rates should not be misread as signs of integration. Instead, we document how a network of shallow banking market integration can rapidly disintegrate. However, our analysis, like all price-based analyses, has its limitations, too. In particular, it is not well suited to identify the underlying drivers of integration and dis-integration. Here, quantity-based analyses as well as detailed country studies are valuable complementary exercises for expanding our understanding of the emergence of deep integration. Yet, in order to draw correct policy conclusions, policy makers need to be aware of the respective strengths and weaknesses of these different integration measures. Our approach complements existing integration analyses based on price- quantity- and news-based measures, such as the ECB's financial integration reports. Because financial integration, particularly banking market integration, is an important pillar for risk-sharing in a monetary union that lacks a political union, our discovery of a deeply disrupted network lends support to calls to complete the European Banking Union in all of its aspects, particularly the currently still missing European Deposit Insurance. Completing the Banking Union and – as argued by Hoffmann et al. (2019) – the complementary Capital Market Union could thus be the missing links that enable the common currency to unify the increasingly fragmented Eurozone banking markets, as envisioned by Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa more than 20 years ago.