دانلود مقاله الحاق بهشت مالیاتی و شفافیت گزارشگری مالی
خلاصه
1. مقدمه
2 پیشینه، تحقیقات مرتبط و فرضیه ها
3 انتخاب نمونه و طراحی تحقیق
4 نتایج تجربی اولیه
5 تجزیه و تحلیل اضافی
6. نتیجه گیری
پیوست 1: گزیده هایی از افشای شرکت های بهشت مالیاتی
پیوست 2: تعاریف متغیر
پیوست 3: محاسبه TRANS
منابع
Abstract
1 Introduction
2 Background, related research, and hypotheses
3 Sample selection and research design
4 Primary empirical results
5 Additional analyses
6 Conclusion
Appendix 1: Excerpts from tax haven firm disclosures
Appendix 2: Variable definitions
Appendix 3: Calculation of TRANS
References
چکیده
تصور گسترده ای وجود دارد که بهشت های مالیاتی عدم شفافیت شرکت ها را تسهیل می کند. این مطالعه شواهد جدیدی را در مورد ارتباط بین بهشت‌های مالیاتی و شفافیت گزارشگری مالی شرکت‌ها با استفاده از گروه منحصربه‌فردی از شرکت‌هایی ارائه می‌کند که شرکت‌های اصلی آنها در بهشت‌های مالیاتی ثبت شده‌اند، اما دفتر مرکزی یا عملیات اصلی آنها - یعنی پایگاه آنها - در کشورهای غیرمنجاقی است. در حالی که بیشتر تحقیقات نشان می دهد که ارتباط منفی بین بهشت های مالیاتی و شفافیت وجود دارد، من بررسی می کنم که آیا این ارتباط به محیط حاکمیت شرکتی و همچنین انگیزه های بازار سرمایه آن بستگی دارد یا خیر. من دریافتم که ارتباط منفی محدود به شرکت‌هایی است که در کشور پایه حاکمیت ضعیفی دارند. در مقابل، من در میان شرکت‌هایی که در محیط‌های حاکمیتی قوی‌تر هستند، ارتباط مثبتی بین ادغام بهشت مالیاتی و شفافیت یافتم که بیشتر در بین شرکت‌هایی با انگیزه‌های بازار سرمایه بیشتر متمرکز است. یافته‌های من نشان می‌دهد که محققان آینده باید در هنگام فرض یک ارتباط منفی واضح بین بهشت‌های مالیاتی و شفافیت شرکتی احتیاط کنند. این مطالعه همچنین شواهد منحصربفردی ارائه می‌کند که نشان می‌دهد برنامه‌ریزی مالیاتی می‌تواند باعث شفافیت بالاتر در تنظیمات خاص شود.
توجه! این متن ترجمه ماشینی بوده و توسط مترجمین ای ترجمه، ترجمه نشده است.
Abstract
A widespread perception exists that tax havens facilitate corporate opacity. This study provides new evidence on the association between tax havens and the transparency of firm financial reporting using a unique group of firms whose parent companies are incorporated in tax havens but whose headquarters or primary operations—that is, their base—are in nonhaven countries. While most research suggests a negative association between tax havens and transparency, I examine whether this association depends on the firm’s corporate governance environment as well as its capital market incentives. I find that the negative association is limited to firms subject to weak governance in the base country. In contrast, I find, among firms in stronger governance environments, a positive association between tax haven incorporation and transparency, which is most concentrated among firms with greater capital market incentives. My findings suggest that future researchers should use caution when assuming an unambiguous negative association between tax havens and corporate transparency. The study also provides unique evidence that tax planning can motivate higher transparency in certain settings.
Introduction
A widespread belief exists that firms’ use of tax havens facilitates corporate opacity. Tax havens have unique regulations that can weaken shareholders’ ability to discipline managers and directors and can provide opportunities for reduced reporting quality or disclosure for tax haven–incorporated companies (Kun 2004; Moon 2018), which may motivate their managers to be less transparent. Many observers, including researchers, policymakers, and the media, have expressed concerns that tax havens let managers misbehave and hide information from financial statement users (e.g., Desai 2005; Morgenthau 2012; Black et al. 2013; Durnev et al. 2016, 2017; Atwood and Lewellen 2019). For example, the U.S. Senate has argued that the unique laws of tax havens can be used to circumvent U.S. securities safeguards, including disclosure requirements (U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations 2006). Many sources also suggest that tax haven–incorporated companies provide financial information that is unreliable or insufficient to portray a firm’s economic situation.
Conclusion
I provide new evidence on the association between tax haven use and financial reporting transparency using a unique sample of “tax haven firms” with tax haven–incorporated parents that are based primarily in a nonhaven country. I examine whether the association between tax haven incorporation and transparency is conditional on the firm’s corporate governance environment and capital market incentives. My results indicate that the association between tax haven incorporation and transparency depends on the strength of governance in the base country (i.e., the nonhaven country of headquarters or primary operations), in conjunction with capital market incentives. While I find an overall negative association between tax haven incorporation and transparency in the full sample, I find that firms facing weak country-level governance in the base country drive the baseline negative association. In contrast, I find that capital market incentives motivate tax haven firms to provide highertransparency, compared to other multinationals, among firms based in strong governance countries and firms based in weak governance countries with less severe potential internal governance problems. My study provides evidence that low transparency associated with tax havens is not ubiquitous, and the findings suggest that future researchers should use caution when assuming an unambiguous negative association between tax havens and transparency.