دانلود مقاله دینامیک ساختار سرمایه و نظارت هیئت مدیره
چکیده
مقدمه
مطالعات مرتبط
داده ها و روش ها
نتایج و بحث
نتیجه گیری
منابع
Abstract
Introduction
Related literature
Data and methods
Results and discussion
Conclusion
References
چکیده
ما تأثیر ویژگی‌های هیئت مدیره را بر سرعت تعدیل و پویایی ساختار سرمایه شرکت‌ها در اقتصادهای مبتنی بر بانک بررسی می‌کنیم. با استفاده از 3927 مشاهدات سالانه شرکت در طی یک دوره 10 ساله (2009-2019)، متوجه می‌شویم که ویژگی هیئت مدیره بر سرعت تعدیل شرکت‌ها در یک سیستم بانک محور (ذینفعان محور) تأثیر می‌گذارد. ما همچنین شواهدی پیدا کردیم که نشان می‌دهد ویژگی‌های هیئت‌مدیره تأثیرات متفاوتی بر ساختار سرمایه شرکت‌های ژاپنی، فرانسوی و آلمانی دارد. نتیجه می گیریم که ساختار سرمایه شرکت ها منعکس کننده محیط حاکمیت شرکتی است که آنها عمل می کنند. نتایج ما برای حسابداری درون زایی و اندازه گیری اهرم جایگزین قوی است.
توجه! این متن ترجمه ماشینی بوده و توسط مترجمین ای ترجمه، ترجمه نشده است.
Abstract
We examine the impact of board characteristics on the speed of adjustment and the capital structure dynamics of firms in bank-based economies. Using 3927 firm-year observations over a 10-year (2009–2019), we find that board characteristic influences firms' speed of adjustment in a bank-based (stakeholder-oriented) system. We also find some evidence that board characteristics have varying impacts on the capital structure of Japanese, French and German firms. We conclude that firms' capital structure reflects the corporate governance environment they operate. Our results are robust to accounting for endogeneity and alternative leverage measure.
Introduction
Prior studies have shown the importance of agency relationships on firms' financing decisions. These studies postulate that corporate governance characteristics are important determinants of firms' capital structure (Becker-Blease and Irani 2008; Kieschnick and Moussawi 2018; Kim et al. 2007; Liao et al. 2015; Morellec et al. 2012). One key channel through which corporate governance influences firms' capital structure in a shareholder-oriented CG environment is by adjusting leverage to the level desired by the firm's shareholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976). In line with the agency theory of free cash flow, the board is likely to support more debt to reduce cash diversion and free cash flow available to firms' managers. Its role is to ensure that shareholders decide what is considered an optimal debt level. Thus, leverage is an essential instrument of control in (market-based) shareholder-oriented CG environment such as in the UK and US.
Conclusion
In this study, we examine and compares the impact of board characteristics on the capital structure and speed of adjustment of Japanese, German and French firms. This study is important because these three countries have distinct corporate governance environment but also remarkable differences in their corporate governance environment.
We show that board characteristics influence speedier adjustment for Japanese, French and German firms. This result may be due to the role of corporate governance in mitigating agency conflict. The speediest adjustment (with or without CG characteristics) is found among German firms followed by French firms before Japanese firms, confirming the variation in the CG environment even among firms in bank-based economies.
H1. SOA will be higher for German firms compared to French and Japanese firms.
H2. Board gender diversity has a negative relationship with leverage in German and French firms and no relationship in Japanese firms.
H3. Outside director has a negative relationship with leverage in German and French firms and a positive relationship in Japanese firms.
H4. Board size has a negative relationship with leverage in German, French and Japanese firms.
H3. Board meeting has a positive relationship with leverage in German and Japanese firms and a negative relationship in French firms.