دانلود مقاله اثر پیوندهای کمیته حسابرسی و تخصص صنعت بر سرمایه گذاران
چکیده
مقدمه
نظریه و فرضیه های تحقیق
آزمایش 1
آزمایش 1: نتایج
آزمایش 2: بسط نظریه اعتبار منبع
بحث و نتایج
منابع
Abstract
Introduction
Theory and research hypotheses
Experiment 1
Experiment 1: results
Experiment 2: Extension of Source Credibility Theory
Discussion and conclusions
References
چکیده
روابط شخصی (مثلاً متعلق به یک باشگاه کشوری) و/یا روابط حرفه ای (به عنوان مثال، خدمت در هیئت مدیره با هم) بین مدیر عامل و اعضای کمیته حسابرسی به طور بالقوه می تواند به عینیت اعضا آسیب برساند. علاوه بر این، تحقیقات قبلی نشان می دهد که تخصص اعضای کمیته حسابرسی در صنعت کیفیت گزارشگری مالی را افزایش می دهد. در آزمایشی با 342 سرمایه‌گذار با آگاهی منطقی، همانطور که توسط نظریه اعتبار منبع (SCT) فرض شده است، دریافتیم که روابط شخصی بیش از روابط حرفه‌ای بر ارزیابی‌های سرمایه‌گذاران از استقلال کمیته حسابرسی تأثیر منفی می‌گذارد و تخصص صنعت ارزیابی شایستگی را افزایش می‌دهد. ما همچنین متوجه شدیم که سرمایه‌گذاران کمیته‌های حسابرسی بدون پیوند و تخصص صنعتی (روابط شخصی و بدون تخصص صنعتی) را به‌عنوان کمترین (کمترین) مؤثر ارزیابی می‌کنند و بیشترین (کمترین) احتمال سرمایه‌گذاری را نشان می‌دهند. علاوه بر این، با گسترش SCT، متوجه می‌شویم که اثر مثبت افزایشی تخصص در صنعت زمانی که روابط شخصی وجود دارد بیشتر از زمانی است که هیچ پیوندی وجود ندارد. در یک مدل مسیر، ارزیابی شایستگی و استقلال مستقیماً بر یکدیگر تأثیر می‌گذارد و به نوبه خود بر ارزیابی اثربخشی کمیته حسابرسی و تصمیمات سرمایه‌گذاری تأثیر می‌گذارد. در نهایت، در آزمایش دوم، متوجه می‌شویم که سرمایه‌گذاران نسبتاً آگاه، تغییرات در ماهیت روابط شخصی را تشخیص می‌دهند و تخصص صنعت تأثیر روابط مشاوره‌ای را کاهش می‌دهد، اما روابط دوستانه نزدیک را نه.
توجه! این متن ترجمه ماشینی بوده و توسط مترجمین ای ترجمه، ترجمه نشده است.
Abstract
Personal ties (e.g., belonging to the same country club) and/or professional ties (e.g., serving on boards together) between the CEO and audit committee members can potentially impair members' objectivity. Additionally, prior research indicates that audit committee member industry expertise enhances financial reporting quality. In an experiment with 342 reasonably informed investors, we find, as hypothesized by Source Credibility Theory (SCT), personal ties negatively impact investors’ assessments of audit committee independence more than professional ties, and industry expertise enhances assessments of competence. We also find investors assess audit committees with no ties and industry expertise (personal ties and no industry expertise) as the most (least) effective and indicate the highest (lowest) likelihood of investing. Further, extending SCT we find the incremental positive effect of industry expertise is greater when there are personal ties than when there are no ties. In a path model, competence and independence assessments directly affect each other, and in turn affect assessments of audit committee effectiveness and investment decisions. Finally, in a second experiment we find reasonably informed investors recognize variations in the nature of personal ties and that industry expertise attenuates the effect of advisory ties but not close friendship ties.
Introduction
The purpose of this study is to examine the effects of audit committee members' ties to the CEO and industry expertise on investors' assessments of the independence and effectiveness of the audit committee and on investment decisions. Ties to the CEO are important since prior research suggests that it is imperative to distinguish between the “substance” and the “form” of the independence of corporate governance parties (Carcello, Hermanson, & Ye, 2011; Carcello, Neal, Palmrose, & Scholz, 2011; Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, & Wright, 2008). That is, boards and committees may appear to be independent, but, in fact, they may not be truly objective. For instance, under current regulations (e.g., SOX 2002), members of the audit committee may not be considered independent if they have any material economic affiliation with the company or its management. However, members can have personal ties (e.g., belonging to the same country club) and/or professional ties (e.g., having served on boards together) with the CEO or other members of top management that could substantively impair audit committee members’ objectivity (Cohen et al., 2008; Guedj & Barnea, 2007; Westphal & Stern, 2006).1
Discussion and conclusions
Drawing on Source Credibility Theory, we employ an experiment to investigate how disclosure of ties (personal, professional and no ties) between audit committee members and the CEO and industry expertise (mentioned, not mentioned) of audit committee members affect reasonably informed investors’ assessments of the independence, competence, and effectiveness of the audit committee as well as their investment decisions.
H1. Investors will assess audit committees with members who have personal ties to the CEO to be less independent than audit committees with members who have professional ties to the CEO.
H2. Investors will assess audit committees with members who have industry ties to be more competent than audit committees with members who do not have industry ties.
H3. Investors' will assess the overall effectiveness of the audit committee to be the highest (lowest) when the audit committee has no ties to the CEO and has industry expertise (personal ties to the CEO and has no industry expertise).
H4. Investors' will be most (least) likely to invest in companies when audit committee members have no ties and have industry expertise (personal ties and no industry expertise).
H5. The negative effects of personal ties on assessments of audit committee effectiveness and investment decisions will be more attenuated when audit committee members have industry expertise than when they do not have industry expertise.
H6. The negative effects of advisory (friendship) personal ties on assessments of audit committee effectiveness and investment decisions will be attenuated (not attenuated) when audit committee members have industry expertise than when they do not have industry expertise.