دانلود مقاله اثر افزایش قیمت نفت بر تورم و انتظارات تورمی
چکیده
مقدمه
مدل ساختاری VAR
تحلیل تجربی تورم CPI
تحلیل تجربی تورم PCE
پیامدهای نرخ تورم سال به سال
نتایجی که اظهار شده
منابع
Abstract
Introduction
The structural VAR model
Empirical analysis of CPI inflation
Empirical analysis of PCE inflation
Implications for year-over-year inflation rates
Concluding remarks
References
چکیده
افزایش مداوم قیمت نفت و بنزین از اواسط سال 2020، نگرانی‌ها از افزایش مداوم تورم ایالات متحده برای سال‌های آینده و افزایش انتظارات تورمی، همراه با نگرانی‌ها در مورد ظهور مارپیچ قیمت دستمزد را افزایش داده است. با استفاده از داده‌های تا ماه می ۲۰۲۲، نشان می‌دهیم که این نگرانی‌ها اغراق‌آمیز شده‌اند. شواهدی مبنی بر اینکه شوک های قیمت بنزین انتظارات تورمی بلندمدت خانوارها را تغییر داده باشد یا اثر تورمی شوک های قیمت بنزین پایدار باشد وجود ندارد. اثرات کوتاه مدت بر تورم کل قابل توجه است، اما تنها بخش کوچکی از تورم کلی را به خود اختصاص داده است. برای مثال، بر اساس سال به سال، انتظار می‌رود شوک‌های قیمت بنزین تورم PCE را به میزان 1.9 درصد در پایان سال 2022 و 0.8 درصد در پایان سال 2023 افزایش دهد، با این فرض که قیمت نفت پس از ماه می 2022 در سطح 110 دلار در هر بشکه باقی می ماند. در مقابل، تأثیر بر تورم اصلی PCE در سال های 2022 و 2023 تنها 0.3 واحد درصد است. این برآوردها قبلاً افزایش انتظارات تورمی را نشان می دهد. اوج تاثیر بر انتظارات تورمی یک ساله خانوارها 0.7 واحد درصد است، در حالی که بر انتظارات 5 ساله تنها 0.15 واحد درصد است.
توجه! این متن ترجمه ماشینی بوده و توسط مترجمین ای ترجمه، ترجمه نشده است.
Abstract
The sustained increase in oil and gasoline prices since mid-2020 has raised fears of persistently high U.S. inflation for years to come and rising inflation expectations, along with concerns about the emergence of a wage-price spiral. Using data through May 2022, we show that these concerns have been overstated. There is no evidence that gasoline price shocks have moved long-run household inflation expectations or that the inflationary effect of gasoline price shocks is persistent. The short-run effects on headline inflation are sizable, but have accounted for only a small fraction of overall inflation. For example, on a year-over-year basis, gasoline price shocks are expected to raise headline PCE inflation by 1.9 percentage points at the end of 2022 and by 0.8 percentage points at the end of 2023, under the assumption that the price of oil remains at $110/barrel after May 2022. In contrast, the impact on core PCE inflation in 2022 and 2023 is only 0.3 percentage points each. These estimates already account for increases in inflation expectations. The peak impact on 1-year household inflation expectations is 0.7 percentage points, while that on 5-year expectations is only 0.15 percentage points.
Introduction
The acceleration in U.S. inflation rates starting in 2021 reflected rising demand, as the economy adapted to the COVID-19 pandemic, tight labor markets, supply chain disruptions and the recovery of energy prices from their pandemic lows. With the price of West Texas Intermediate (WTI) oil rising above $80/barrel in October 2021 and temporarily reaching more than $120/barrel after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in early 2022, concerns have grown among policymakers and analysts that the surge in motor fuel prices could push U.S. inflation higher for extended periods and drive up consumers’ inflation expectations, causing inflation expectations to become embedded in the wage and price setting process. For example, analysts at the Bank of America warned as early as October 1, 2021, that a surge in oil and gasoline prices above $100 would spark inflation (see Lee 2021). As U.S. inflation rates reached levels unprecedented in recent history in early 2022, a policy debate about how to curb rising motor fuel prices gathered momentum, yet there has been no quantitative analysis of the inflationary impact of the recent surge in gasoline prices.
Concluding remarks
In this paper, we presented simple tools that allow researchers to understand the impact of oil price fluctuations on inflation and inflation expectations, both based on historical data and under hypothetical scenarios about the future evolution of the price of crude oil. The methods discussed in this paper are of general interest to central bankers and macroeconomists. We focused on the scenario of the WTI price of oil remaining at $110/barrel after May 2022. Recently, more aggressive oil price scenarios have been advanced. For example, analysts working for J.P. Morgan Chase & Co in July 2022 warned that oil prices could reach $380 per barrel if Russia responds to sanctions by cutting its crude oil production. At the same time, analysts at Citigroup cautioned that oil prices may drop as low as $45/barrel by the end of 2023, if the world enters a steep recession. It would be straightforward to examine the implications of such more extreme scenarios using the tools we employed in this paper.