دانلود مقاله شبکه هیئت مدیره بانک و ثبات مالی
چکیده
مقدمه
چارچوب مفهومی
شبکه هیئت مدیره بانک
داده ها و متغیرها
نتایج
کانال های احتمالی
بحث و نتیجه گیری
منابع
Abstract
Introduction
Conceptual framework
Bank board network
Data and variables
Results
Possible channels
Discussions and conclusions
References
چکیده
این مطالعه نشان می‌دهد که شبکه هیئت‌مدیره با بهبود ثبات مالی بانک‌ها از طریق کیفیت دارایی، ریسک ورشکستگی و نوسانات سود مرتبط است. علاوه بر این، شبکه هیئت مدیره برای بانک های بخش خصوصی در هند حیاتی تر است. شبکه هیئت مدیره همچنین عملکرد بانک ها را بهبود می بخشد و شواهدی را به نفع دیدگاه وابستگی به منابع یکپارچه هیئت مدیره ارائه می دهد. تابلوهای متصل به خوبی دسترسی اطلاعات را افزایش می دهند و عدم تقارن اطلاعاتی بین بانک و وام گیرنده آن را کاهش می دهند. برای شرکت‌های مالی، محدود کردن تعداد پست‌های مدیریتی برای مدیران بانک‌ها ممکن است اثر مطلوبی بر نتایج بانک نداشته باشد.
توجه! این متن ترجمه ماشینی بوده و توسط مترجمین ای ترجمه، ترجمه نشده است.
Abstract
This study finds that the board network is related to improvements in the financial stability of banks given by asset quality, insolvency risk and volatility of profits. Further, the board network is more critical for the private sector banks in India. The board network also improves the performance of banks, providing evidence in favor of the integrated resource dependence view of the board. Well-connected boards increase information availability and reduce the information asymmetry between the bank and its borrower. For financial firms, restricting the number of directorial positions for bank directors may not have any desirable effect on bank outcomes.
Introduction
Corporate governance of banks requires special attention as they differ from non-financial institutions in terms of regulation, capital structure, complexity and opacity of their business structure (Haan and Vlahu, 2016; Levine, 2004). Further, as bank failure generates economy-wide negative externalities, large banks have an implicit guarantee against failure, and this can breed excessive risk-taking tendencies of managers of large banks (Haan and Vlahu, 2016). In general, bank boards are larger than the boards of nonfinancial firms owing to the complexities of banking operations and regulations. Studies have highlighted that the board structure of banks (Adams and Meheran, 2012; Pathan and Faff, 2013), and ownership structure (Laeven and Levine, 2009) affect bank outcomes. More recently, the study by Abdelbadie and Salama (2019) find that the board network reduces the credit, insolvency, and capital risks of banks in the United States. The review paper on corporate governance in banks by John et al. (2016) also emphasizes that future research on the importance of corporate governance of banks needs to focus on the role of director networks.
Discussions and conclusions
Since the GFC, the policymakers have laid great importance to the corporate governance of banks to ensure that banks do not engage in excess risk-taking behavior. Several studies have examined the link between various aspects of the governance structure of banks, including ownership, board structure, and incentives of the CEOs. In this study, we examine the role of the board network of banks and its relation with financial stability in the context of an emerging market economy like India. We consider only the listed banks in India and construct the first and second-level connections between bank directors and other directors sitting on listed as well as unlisted companies with the help of appointment and cessation dates for the period 2009–2019. We find that the indirect connections of the banks have increased by around 40% during the last decade. Further, the public sector banks in India are less connected than private banks in India.