چکیده
1. مقدمه
2. روش ها و مواد
3. بررسی ادبیات
4. نظریه بازی و مدل MCDM برای IBA
5. تجزیه و تحلیل و بحث
6. محدودیت ها و مراحل بعدی
7. نتیجه گیری و پیشنهادات
قدردانی
ضمیمه - قراردادهای تأثیر و سود در نوناووت
منابع
Abstract
1. Introduction
2. Methods and materials
3. Literature review
4. Game theory and MCDM model for IBAs
5. Analysis and discussion
6. Limitations and next steps
7. Conclusion and recommendations
Acknowledgments
Appendix – Impact and benefit agreements in Nunavut
References
چکیده
این تحقیق با استفاده از تصمیم گیری چند معیاره (MCDM) و تئوری بازی، رویکرد جدیدی برای تجزیه و تحلیل قراردادهای تأثیر و سود (IBA) دارد. جوامع محلی، که اغلب جوامع بومی هستند، با تصمیمات دشواری در رابطه با معاوضه تاثیرات در مقابل منافع حاصل از توسعه منابع معدنی روبرو هستند. تجزیه و تحلیل IBA ها معمولاً بر مزایای اقتصادی آنها متمرکز است اما معیارهای زیست محیطی، اجتماعی-فرهنگی و سایر معیارهای پایداری را در نظر نمی گیرند. با در نظر نگرفتن این معیارها، روشهای کنونی برای پیشبینی کافی بودن یا پذیرفته شدن IBA تلاش میکنند. این تحقیق مدلی را با MCDM ایجاد می کند که مبادلات پایداری پیچیده را برای جوامع در طول مذاکرات توسعه معدنی متعادل می کند. مواضع چانه زنی شرکت ها یا جوامع تحت تاثیر نیز یک عامل ضروری و در عین حال مطالعه نشده در تجزیه و تحلیل IBA است. تئوری بازی برای نشان دادن اینکه چگونه موقعیتهای چانهزنی میتوانند بر غرامت گنجانده شده در IBA تأثیر بگذارند، استفاده میشود. در مجموع، این تحقیق مدلی را توسعه میدهد که میتواند معیارها، سیستمهای ارزشی، و پیامدهای همکاری یا رقابت را برای پیشبینی پذیرش IBA در نظر بگیرد. این مطالعه توصیه هایی را ارائه می دهد که می تواند در سایر پروژه های توسعه منابعی که جوامع را تحت تأثیر قرار می دهند، اعمال کند. این مدل اهمیت انعطاف پذیری در طراحی، پویایی قدرت در چانه زنی، همکاری و اشتراک دانش را نشان می دهد.
توجه! این متن ترجمه ماشینی بوده و توسط مترجمین ای ترجمه، ترجمه نشده است.
Abstract
This research takes a novel approach to analyzing impact and benefit agreements (IBA) using multiple-criteria decision making (MCDM) and game theory. Local communities, which are often Indigenous communities, face with difficult decisions regarding the trade-offs of impacts vs. benefits from mineral resource development. Analyses of IBAs typically focus on their economic benefits but fail to consider environmental, socio-cultural, and other sustainability criteria. By not considering these criteria, current methods struggle to predict if an IBA is adequate or if it will be accepted. This research develops a model with MCDM that balances complex sustainability trade-offs for communities during mineral development negotiations. Bargaining positions of companies or impacted communities are also an essential, yet understudied factor in IBA analyses. Game theory is employed to show how bargaining positions can affect the compensation included in an IBA. In all, this research develops a model that can consider different criteria, value systems, and the implications of cooperation or competition to predict if an IBA will be accepted. This study provides recommendations, which can be applied other resource development projects which impact communities. The model shows the importance of flexibility in design, power dynamics in bargaining, cooperation, and knowledge sharing.
Introduction
The mining industry is at a crossroads. Society's growing demand for minerals continues to push for more mines, but many projects struggle to secure permits due to opposition from impacted Indigenous communities and other stakeholders. The continued growth of the mining industry impacts communities on countless socio-environmental levels, which are not easily accounted for during project evaluation. Impact and benefit agreements (IBAs) were developed to create collaborative solutions to balance the impacts and benefits of mineral development for communities. IBAs are contracts between impacted groups and project proponents that typically outline the benefits the community will receive, in terms of compensation and economic opportunities, as well as the strategies for impact mitigation (Gibson and O'Faircheallaigh, 2015). IBAs formalize a company-community partnership with the goal of reducing project delays and disruptions from protests, blockades, or legal opposition (Ali, 2003). The issue is that it is not well understood what exactly should be included in IBAs to balance the impacts vs. benefits of a project (Cascadden et al., 2021). There are several guidelines created for IBAs, e.g., Gibson and O'Faircheallaigh (2015), but there is a critical lack of formalized methods that can incorporate community values and predict if IBAs will be accepted and successful. The main questions of this research are: How can we predict if an IBA will be accepted? What are the main factors for a successful IBA? How can IBAs be better aligned to the wants, needs, and values of communities? And, what are the sustainability challenges with IBAs for mineral development projects? To better understand these questions, this research's goal is to create a new method to analyze IBAs.
Conclusion and recommendations
To summarize, the following list provides several key recommendations uncovered from this research for individuals looking to develop IBAs or predict if it will be accepted:
A project which provides alternatives which can trade-off between all important criteria, can make a project more likely to be accepted.
Before negotiations, bargaining factors should be analyzed to understand which group will potentially be at an advantage. The main factors–patience, knowledge, uncertainty, and power to make proposals–should be discussed and mediated.
Mineral policies should require proponents to provide flexible alternatives for all important criteria to communities.